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THE SEC’S POTENTIAL APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE DEFECT AND HOW IT
COULD IMPACT THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
Randall Bryer∗

INTRODUCTION
Twice since the turn of the twenty-first century, the United States
corporate and financial sectors have been embroiled in scandals, which have
1
been covered heavily in the national news media. The persistent negative
publicity led to widespread public outrage and swift congressional response
in the form of increased regulation and oversight. Following the corporate
accounting scandals in 2001, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 (“Sarbanes-Oxley”), which created the Public Company Accounting
2
Oversight Board (“PCAOB”). In 2010, the Supreme Court held that the
PCAOB’s two layers of for-cause removal violated the separation of powers
and the vesting of executive power in the President by insulating the Board
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The first scandal occurred after Enron’s collapse in 2001 and other accounting scandals,
when criticism rained down on these companies and, “[a]s the audit failures piled up on
one another, investors lost confidence in managers, market intermediaries and auditors
alike.” William W. Bratton, Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and Accounting: Rules Versus Principles
Versus Rents, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1023, 1023 (2003); see also Gretchen Morgenson, Worries of
More Enrons to Come Give Stock Prices a Pounding, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2002, at C1 (reporting
on the Enron scandal’s effects on the economy). The second scandal occurred after the
2007 financial crisis, when millions of homes were foreclosed on and governments and
banks worldwide spent more than $17 trillion assisting financial institutions. Arthur E.
Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act: A Flawed and Inadequate Response to the Too-Big-to-Fail
Problem, 89 OR. L. REV. 951, 957 (2011) (detailing the severe and far-reaching nature of
the financial crisis); Laura Kusisto, Many Who Lost Homes to Foreclosure in Last Decade Won’t
Return—NAR, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 20, 2015, 12:50 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/manywho-lost-homes-to-foreclosure-in-last-decade-wont-return-nar-1429548640.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 101(a), 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified
in scattered sections of 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.) (establishing PCAOB, “in order to
protect the interests of investors and further the public interest in the preparation of
informative, accurate, and independen audit reports for companies the securities of
which are sold to, and held by and for, public investors”).
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3

from presidential oversight or control. Following the 2007 global financial
crisis, Congress responded with the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
4
Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank” or “Dodd-Frank Act”), which
increased the scope of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (“SEC”)
5
regulatory and enforcement capabilities. Prior to the Dodd-Frank Act, the
SEC could require only registered brokers and investment advisers to pay
fines in in-house proceedings presided over by Administrative Law Judges
6
(“ALJs”), whereas it only could bring insider trading, securities fraud, or
7
accounting fraud actions against unregistered individuals in federal court.
Indeed, in 2013, the SEC filed 755 actions in the prior year—the most in its
history for a given year—ranging from “market structure to financial
reporting, asset management to insider trading, municipal securities, FCPA,
8
and more,” which netted the SEC $16 million in penalties. Dodd-Frank
9
empowered the SEC to decide where to bring enforcement proceedings.
In the years following congressional action and the eventual decrease in
10
public and congressional outrage, however, the affected industries have
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See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 496 (2010)
(holding that because the President was unable “to oversee the Board, or to attribute the
Board’s failings to those whom he [could] oversee, [he was] no longer the judge of the
Board’s conduct,” which “is contrary to Article II’s vesting of the executive power in the
President”). However, this victory was more symbolic than substantive, since the Court
merely severed the statute’s for-cause removal provision, leaving intact the Board’s broad
powers. Id. at 508; Jerome Nelson, Administrative Law Judges’ Removal “Only For Cause”: Is
That Administrative Procedure Act Protection Now Unconstitutional?, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 401,
408 (2011) (“Despite language which may have pleased the plaintiffs philosophically, the
decision had no impact on the Board’s investigation of the accounting firm, nor did it
alter the PCAOB’s rules, policies, or procedures.”).
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
See infra Part I.A.
See 17 C.F.R. § 200.14(a) (1995) (delineating the responsibilities that SEC ALJs have).
Peter J. Henning, The S.E.C.’s Use of the ‘Rocket Docket’ Is Challenged, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK
(Aug. 25, 2014, 11:48 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/08/25/the-s-e-c-s-use-ofthe-rocket-docket-is-challenged/?_r=0; see also Andrew Ceresney, Dir., Securities and
Exchange Comm’n Div. Enf’t, Remarks to the American Bar Association’s Business Law
Section Fall Meeting (Nov. 21, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/
Detail/Speech/1370543515297 (explaining how penalties against entities not regulated
by the SEC were only available in the district court before the Dodd-Frank Act was
enacted).
Ceresney, supra note 7.
See Josh Beckerman, SEC Proposes Changes to Administrative Proceedings, WALL ST. J. (Sept.
24, 2015, 6:25 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-proposes-changes-to-administrativeproceedings-1443133524 (noting that partly due to the enhanced powers accorded to the
SEC under Dodd-Frank, “[t]he agency has increasingly steered cases to hearings in front
of its appointed administrative judges rather than taking them to federal court”).
See Floyd Norris, Financial Crisis, Over and Already Forgotten, N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/23/business/the-financial-crisis-alreadyforgotten.html?_r=0 (describing a House Financial Services Committee hearing in which
some congressmen questioned the need for the Financial Stability Oversight Council,
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sought to invalidate the recently enacted changes by suing in federal court.
In September 2015, the SEC responded to Due Process challenges to its ALJ
proceedings by proposing new rules that provide for more thorough
hearings, which it claimed would “modernize our rules of practice for
administrative proceedings, including provisions for additional time and
12
prescribed discovery for the parties.” On July 29, 2016, the SEC adopted
13
the amendments “substantially as proposed.” The SEC’s use of ALJs for
enforcement actions previously brought in federal courts has been a
particular source of strife.
The purpose of this Comment is to examine whether the SEC’s ALJ
appointments violate Article II’s Appointments Clause. If ALJs are inferior
officers, as has been argued, then the President, a court of law, or a
14
department head must appoint them. Unlike other legal works to date,
this Comment analyzes the effects of an Appointments Clause violation on
both the SEC and the administrative state as a whole. Even if the Supreme
Court were to rule that no constitutional infirmity exists, the Comment
argues that the challenges would have been successful at least in part
because the SEC and Congress have already responded to the negative
publicity stemming from the Due Process and Appointments Clause claims.
Part I briefly explains how the recent financial crises have contributed to
the contentious climate with respect to the SEC and provides background
information on the SEC’s enforcement scheme and statutory structure, as
well as the appointment process of SEC ALJs and the powers ALJs possess.
Part II discusses the merits of the more recent structural constitutional
challenges. First, it considers whether federal jurisdiction exists prior to the
completion of an administrative proceeding. Assuming jurisdiction exists, it
discusses whether the Appointments Clause and the two layers of for-cause
removal challenges are likely to succeed. Both challenges depend on
whether ALJs are inferior officers. Historically, the Supreme Court has not
15
established clear criteria for what constitutes an inferior officer. The Court
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which had been established under Dodd-Frank to ensure that financial institutions would
have enough capital to avoid future financial crises).
See infra Part II (discussing the challenges that litigants have posed to the SEC’s ability to
bring administrative enforcement actions under Dodd-Frank).
Press Release, SEC, SEC Proposes to Amend Rules Governing Administrative Proceedings
(Sept. 24, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-209.html.
Amendments to the Commission’s Rules of Practice, 81 Fed. Reg. 50212-01, 50214 (July
29, 2016) (codified at 71 C.F.R. pt. 201 (2016)).
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[T]he Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such
inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in
the Heads of Departments.”).
See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 671 (1988) (“In the practical course of the
government there does not seem to have been any exact line drawn, who are and who are
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may be wary of upending the administrative state by holding that ALJs are
inferior officers.
Part III considers the potential repercussions for the SEC if the Supreme
Court were to rule that ALJs are inferior officers. It examines how other
agencies that were recently found to have had defective appointments—the
National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) and the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (“CFPB”)—dealt with these challenges and how it
affected prior decisions. It also considers the effects a finding that ALJs are
inferior officers would have on the Social Security Administration—the
16
agency that relies most heavily on ALJs—as well as on other agencies.
Part IV argues that even if the Court does not eventually rule that ALJs
are inferior officers, the current litigation already has and likely will
continue to change SEC practices. The Due Process and Equal Protection
17
claims against the SEC are expected to fail. In spite of their weaknesses as
legal claims, however, they have been highly influential in pressuring the
SEC to modernize its in-house proceedings.
Likewise, even if the
Appointments Clause claim fails, it is likely to transform SEC decisions about
whether to bring enforcement actions in federal courts or before ALJs.
Indeed, the SEC has already responded to the challenges against its use of
18
ALJs.
In the conclusion, I argue that both the Due Process and Appointments
Clause arguments have contributed to bringing about the substantive
changes sought by the SEC’s challengers, and that neither argument, by
itself, would have been sufficient. Although the Due Process claims are
unlikely to prevail in court, they have inspired significant public
19
condemnation of the SEC’s in-house proceedings, leading the SEC to ratify

16

17
18
19

not to be deemed inferior officers, in the sense of the constitution, whose appointment
does not necessarily require the concurrence of the senate.”) (internal citation omitted).
See Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Should Congress Create a Special Category of SSA ALJs?, 38 ADMIN. &
REG. L. NEWS 5, 5 (Winter 2013) (noting that the SSA employs 1400 ALJs, a figure that
accounts for approximately 85% of all ALJs).
See infra Part IV.A
See infra Part IV.B.
E.g., Jean Eaglesham, SEC Wins with In-House Judges, WALL ST. J. (May 6, 2015 10:30 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-wins-with-in-house-judges-1430965803; Jean Eaglesham,
SEC Gives Ground on Judges, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 24, 2015, 8:30 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-gives-ground-on-judges-1443139425; Henning, supra
note 7; Nate Raymond, U.S. Judge Criticizes SEC Use of In-House Court for Fraud Cases,
REUTERS (Nov 5. 2014, 1:45 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/05/us-secfraud-rakoff-idUSKBN0IP2EG20141105#6qxy9Y4k8dl23RSB.97; Russell G. Ryan, The SEC
as
Prosecutor
and
Judge,
WALL ST. J.
(Aug
4,
2014,
7:36
PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/russell-g-ryan-the-sec-as-prosecutor-and-judge-1407195362;
Bob Van Voris & Matt Robinson, For the SEC’s In-House Court, a Question of Justice for All,
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 10, 2015, 5:05 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201508-10/for-the-sec-s-in-house-court-a-question-of-justice-for-all; Daniel Fisher & Daniel R.
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20

new rules to provide for greater process, and moving Congress to propose
legislation giving those subject to SEC civil actions the option of having the
21
proceeding take place before an ALJ or a federal judge. What impact the
Appointments Clause challenges have on ALJs in other agencies will hinge
on whether and on what grounds the Court were to find an Appointments
Clause defect, the retroactive effect of such a ruling, and the willingness of
litigants in other agency proceedings to raise Appointments Clause issues.

I.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES AND THE SEC’S ENFORCEMENT
AND ADJUDICATORY SCHEME

To best understand the motivation behind the recent string of
challenges and the current salience of the issue, it is important to consider
22
the tension between Wall Street and Congress (mostly its Democrats ) and
Congress’s periods of consternation following these crises. This is helpful in
understanding the impetus behind the challenges discussed below.

A. Recent Expansion of the SEC’s Enforcement Capabilities
23

Public outrage following the 2008 financial crisis and the widespread
24
belief that there was not enough government regulation over Wall Street
led the Democratic-controlled Congress to increase the enforcement power
25
of the SEC to better regulate and punish the financial sector.

20
21
22

23

24

25

Walfish, The Real Problem with SEC Administrative Proceedings, and How to Fix It, FORBES (July
20, 2015, 7:55 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2015/07/20/the-realproblem-with-sec-administrative-proceedings-and-how-to-fix-it.
See Press Release, SEC, supra note 12.
Due Process Restoration Act of 2015, H.R. 3798, 114th Cong. § 2(a) (2015).
Binyamin Appelbaum & David M. Herszenhorn, Financial Overhaul Signals Shift on
Deregulation,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
15,
2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/16/business/16regulate.html
(reporting on the
passage of a bill aimed at expanding federal financial regulation, which had been heavily
promoted by congressional Democrats).
See Michael Erman, Five Years After Lehman, Americans Still Angry at Wall Street: Reuters/Ipsos
Poll, REUTERS (Sept. 15, 2013, 7:05 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-wallstreetcrisis-idUSBRE98E06Q20130915 (“As many as 44 percent of those polled believe the
government should not have bailed out financial institutions . . . . Fifty-three percent
think not enough was done to prosecute bankers . . . .” ).
See Catherine Rampell, Lax Oversight Caused Crisis, Bernanke Says, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2010,
at A1 (reporting that according to former Federal Reserve Chairman, Ben Bernanke,
regulatory failure was the primary cause of the housing bubble and subsequent financial
crisis).
Indeed, the SEC reported that for fiscal year 2015, its ALJs issued “207 initial decisions,
held twenty-seven hearings, and ordered civil penalties totaling $20,823,750 and
disgorgement totaling $12,065,036.”
SEC, Office of Administrative Law Judges,
http://www.sec.gov/alj (last visited Sept. 15, 2016).
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As a result, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Act—mostly along party
26
lines —“[t]o promote the financial stability of the United States by
improving accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end
‘too big to fail’, to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to
protect consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for other
27
purposes.” Dodd-Frank gave the SEC the authority to impose monetary
28
fines against individuals and to choose whether to bring enforcement
actions in federal court or within the agency, where it may either appoint an
29
ALJ or have the action decided by the Commission itself. Prior to DoddFrank, the SEC’s in-house enforcement had been limited to cease-and-desist
orders against further illegal activity and to equitable relief in the form of
30
disgorgement against regulated individuals or entities.

B. Background on the ALJ Hiring and Hearing Process
The Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) permits agencies to appoint
31
ALJs to preside over hearings.
Agencies long have relied on hearing
32
officers—previously referred to as examiners. The SEC has defended its
use of ALJs—an authority, it argues, that Congress has provided to it in both
the APA and Dodd-Frank. The SEC notes that it has used ALJs “throughout
the 42-year history of the Division of Enforcement” and that these “ALJs
have been presiding over and adjudicating complex securities cases for
33
decades.”
26

27
28
29
30

31

32

33

See Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009: House Roll Vote No. 968
(Dec. 11, 2009) p. H.R. 4173, http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2009/roll968.xml (reporting
that the overwhelming majority of congressional Democrats voted in favor of DoddFrank, while zero Republicans did so); Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
of 2009: Senate Roll Vote No. 162 (May 20, 2010) p. H.R. 4173,
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=1
11&session=2&vote=00208 (reporting that the vast majority of U.S. senators who voted in
favor of the bill’s passage were Democrats).
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
pmbl., 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
15 U.S.C. § 77h-1(g) (2010) (permiting the SEC to impose civil penalities of varying
amounts on violators of Dodd-Frank).
15 U.S.C. §§ 77t-u.
Paul S. Atkins & Bradley J. Bondi, Evaluating the Mission: A Critical Review of the History and
Evolution of the SEC Enforcement Program, 13 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 367, 392–96
(2008).
See generally 5 U.S.C. §§ 556(a), 557(b) (2012) (authorizing at least one ALJ to preside at
the evidence-collecting stage of the hearing, and, under certain circumstances, to decide
the case altogether); id. § 3105 (requiring that agencies “appoint as many administrative
law judges as are necessary”).
See VANESSA K. BURROWS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34607, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES:
AN OVERVIEW 1 n.2 (2010), http://ssaconnect.com/tfiles/ALJ-Overview.pdf (“In 1978,
Congress changed the title ‘hearing examiners’ to ‘Administrative Law Judges.’”).
Ceresney, supra note 7.
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1. The ALJ Hiring Process
Congress permits the SEC to hold hearings before either the
34
Commission or a designated officer, i.e. an ALJ. The Office of Personnel
Management (“OPM”) oversees the pool of potential ALJ candidates and
35
creates the standards and qualifications needed to become an ALJ. When
an agency wishes to hire an ALJ, OPM provides it with three ALJs to choose
36
37
from, and ranks them “according to their qualifications and skills.” An
agency may borrow ALJs from another agency, a process that OPM
38
39
oversees. ALJs are qualified and experienced attorneys. Of importance
for this Comment, the SEC conceded that the Commissioners do not
40
appoint its ALJs, but rather the SEC’s Chief ALJ does.

34
35

36

37
38

39

40

15 U.S.C. § 77u (2012) (“All hearings shall be public and may be held before the
Commission or an officer or officers of the Commission designated by it . . . .”).
See 5 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (2012) (authorizing OPM to “prescribe regulations for, control,
supervise, and preserve the records of, examinations for the competitive service”). For an
in-depth description of the ALJ hiring process, see BURROWS, supra note 32, at 2–6.
See 5 C.F.R. § 930.204 (1995) (“An agency may appoint an individual to an administrative
law judge position only with prior approval of OPM, except when it makes its selection
from the list of eligibles provided by OPM.”); BURROWS, supra note 32, at 2.
BURROWS, supra note 32, at 2.
See 5 U.S.C. § 3344 (2012) (“An agency . . . which occasionally or temporarily is
insufficiently staffed with administrative law judges . . . may use administrative law judges
selected by the Office of Personnel Management from and with the consent of other
agencies.”); 5 C.F.R. § 930.208 (1995) (noting that, in accordance with § 3344, “OPM
administers an Administrative Law Judge Loan Program that coordinates the loan/detail
of an administrative law judge from one agency to another”).
See BURROWS, supra note 32, at 2–3 (eumerating the qualifications required to become an
ALJ); see also NLRB v. Permanent Label Corp., 657 F.2d 512, 527 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc)
(Aldisert, J., concurring) (“[T]he selection process for ALJs should inspire more respect
for this office than is generally extended by Article III judges; it is a process that requires
rigorous inquiries into the background and competence of the candidates.”); Duka v.
SEC, 103 F. Supp. 3d 382, 387 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (commenting that the ALJ at issue
“ha[d] a distinguished biography”); James P. Timony, Disciplinary Proceedings Against
Federal Administrative Law Judges, 6 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 807, 811–14 & 814 n.43 (1984)
(discussing that in light of the discretion that ALJs possess and the process by which they
are selected, among other feaures of their positions, they yield power similar to that of
Article III judges).
17 C.F.R. § 200.30-10(a)(2) (1995) (granting the Chief ALJ the authority to “designate
administrative law judges pursuant to Rule 110 of the Commission’s Rules of Practice”);
see also Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, 832 F.3d 277, 283 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (noting that the
SEC had acknowledged that the ALJ at issue in the case was illegally appointed).
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2. The ALJ Hearing and Appeals Process
The APA outlines the steps and processes generally available to litigants
41
in an agency proceeding. SEC ALJs’ authority is as broad as provided for
42
by the APA. In an agency hearing, an ALJ has the authority to:
43

(1) Administer oaths and affirmations; (2) Issue subpoenas; (3) Rule
on offers of proof; (4) Examine witnesses; (5) Regulate the course of a
hearing; (6) Hold pre-hearing conferences; (7) Rule upon motions; and
(8) Unless waived by the parties, prepare an initial decision containing
the conclusions as to the factual and legal issues presented, and issue an
44
appropriate order.

Following the issuance of an SEC ALJ’s initial decision, a party has a
45
46
right to appeal that decision to the Commissioners, who review it de novo.
Importantly, even if an initial decision is not appealed or reviewed, it does
not become final until the Commission “issue[s] an order that the decision
47
has become final.” Prior to appealing an adverse agency ruling in federal
court, a party must first appeal to the Commission, since a final order from
48
the Commission is a prerequisite to judicial review. To appeal a final order
49
to a federal court of appeals, a litigant must do so within sixty days.

II.

CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO THE SEC ENFORCEMENT
SCHEME

The SEC’s ability to bring individual in-house enforcement actions has
prompted numerous protests concerning the fairness and constitutionality
of permitting the same case to be brought either in-house or in federal
court. Litigants steered into in-house hearings complain that the amount of
process afforded to them diverges considerably from that which a litigant

41

42

43

44
45
46
47
48
49

See 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2012) (“When the presiding employee makes an initial decision,
that decision then becomes the decision of the agency without further proceedings unless
there is an appeal to, or review on motion of, the agency within time provided by rule.”).
See 17 C.F.R. § 201.111 (1995) (“No provision of these Rules of Practice shall be
construed to limit the powers of the hearing officer provided by the Administrative
Procedure Act.”) (internal citation omitted).
Although an ALJ may issue a subpoena, he or she is unable to compel compliance; that
requires a district court order. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(c) (2012) (establishing that in cases
involving a refusal to obey a Commission-issued subpoena, the Commission must seek
recourse from a federal district court).
17 C.F.R. § 200.14(a) (1995).
Id. §§ 201.360(d), 201.410(a).
Id. § 201.411(a).
Id. § 201.360(d)(2).
Id. § 201.410(e).
15 U.S.C. § 78y(a) (2012).
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50

receives in federal court. Moreover, even the most complex cases must be
51
completed within 300 days of filing. Rather than undergo a truncated,
procedurally incomplete hearing, some have challenged the proceedings in
52
federal district court on Due Process and Equal Protection grounds.
More recently, litigants have contested ALJs’ authority to adjudicate their
claims by arguing that ALJs are unconstitutionally shielded from the
President’s removal power and were not properly appointed under Article
53
II’s Appointments Clause.
Prior to determining the merits of these
challenges, jurisdiction first must be established, which, this Comment
contends, at least arguably exists, although no court of appeals to decide the
54
issue has found jurisdiction.
50

51
52

53

54

See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 23–25, Hill v. SEC, 114 F. Supp. 3d
1297 (N.D. Ga. 2015) (No. 1:15-cv-01801-LMM) (listing the numerous ways in which
administrative proceedings differ from civil proceedings in federal district courts).
17 C.F.R. § 201.360(a)(2) (1995).
See, e.g., Jarkesy v. SEC, 803 F.3d 9, 14 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (alleging a “Fifth Amendment Due
Process Clause violation based on the Commission’s supposed prejudgment of their
charges”); Bebo v. SEC, 799 F.3d 765, 768 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1500
(2016) (alleging that Dodd-Frank “provides the SEC ‘unguided’ authority to choose
which respondents will and which will not receive the procedural protections of a federal
district court, in violation of equal protection and due process guarantees”); Chau v. SEC,
72 F. Supp. 3d 417, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (alleging that “the SEC’s choice to pursue them
administratively, as opposed to suing them in a United States District Court, [had]
deprive[d] them of their rights to due process and equal protection of law”); Altman v.
SEC, 687 F.3d 44, 45 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Altman contends that the actions of the
Commission deprived him of equal protection and due process . . . .”); Gupta v. S.E.C.,
796 F. Supp. 2d 503, 506–07 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (alleging “that the SEC’s unjustified decision
to deprive Gupta, alone, of the opportunity to contest these allegations in federal court”
was “in violation of the Equal Protection Clause”); see infra Part IV.A.
See, e.g., Duka v. SEC, 103 F. Supp. 3d 382, 385 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (alleging that ALJs are
“insulated unlawfully from oversight by the President”), abrogated by Tilton v. SEC, 824
F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 2016) (“Tilton II”); Tilton v. SEC, No. 15-CV-2472-RA, 2015 WL
4006165, at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2015) (“Tilton I”) (arguing that the appointment of
SEC ALJs violated Article II’s Appointments Clause), aff’d Tilton II, 824 F.3d; Hill v. SEC,
114 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1304 (N.D. Ga. 2015) (“Hill I”) (asserting “that the proceeding
violates Article II of the Constitution because ALJs are protected by two layers of tenure
protection”), rev’d Hill v. SEC, 825 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2016) (“Hill II”); Gray Fin. Grp.,
Inc. v. SEC, 166 F. Supp. 3d 1335, 1349 (N.D. Ga. 2015) (alleging “the ALJ’s appointment
violates the Appointments Clause of Article II”), rev’d sub nom. Hill II, 825 F.3d; Ironridge
Global IV, Ltd. v. SEC, 146 F. Supp. 3d 1294, 1312 (N.D. Ga. 2015) (alleging that “the
ALJ’s appointment violates the Appointments Clause of Article II because he was not
appointed by the President, a court of law, or a department head”); Timbervest, LLC v.
SEC, No. 1:15-CV-2106-LMM, 2015 WL 7597428, at *7 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 4, 2015) (arguing
that the ALJ at issue was unconstitutionally shielded from removal by the President and
that he was not properly appointed); Bennett v. SEC, 151 F. Supp. 3d 632, 634 (D. Md.
2015) (alleging that SEC ALJs are unconstitutionally protected in light of the fact that
they can only be removed “for good cause”). For further discussion, see infra Parts II.B &
II.C.
See Hill II, 825 F.3d at 1241 (holding that the district court lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction, and asserting that its holding was consistent with those of other circuits).
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A. Establishing Federal Court Jurisdiction
Traditionally, a litigant may not seek review of an agency action prior to
the exhaustion of administrative remedies, provided the agency’s
55
authorizing statute requires it.
Here, some individuals subject to SEC
proceedings have opted to raise the ALJ appointments issue in agency
hearings, rather than sue the SEC in federal court, thereby avoiding this
jurisdictional issue. In In re Raymond J. Lucia Cos., the SEC Commissioners—
mirroring the SEC’s position in federal court—found (not surprisingly) that
there was no Appointments Clause violation, since ALJs are not inferior
56
57
officers. Two Commissioners dissented. The D.C. Circuit similarly found
58
no Appointments Clause violation.
However, most plaintiffs who have raised Appointments Clause
59
challenges opted to sue the SEC in federal district court.
Since the
challenged proceedings stem from an agency whose authorizing statute
60
provides for exclusive remedies to an adversely effected party, a federal
court first must determine whether it has subject-matter jurisdiction to
61
resolve the claim prior to the exhaustion of those remedies. Although the
Supreme Court has not addressed whether jurisdiction exists, the D.C. and
Seventh Circuits found no jurisdiction, although no Appointments Clause
62
challenges were raised in these cases.
However, Appointments Clause
challenges were raised in the Second, Fourth and Eleventh Circuits. The
55

56
57

58
59
60

61

62

See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 88 (2006) (internal citation omitted) (“The doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies is well established in the jurisprudence of
administrative law.”)
Raymond J. Lucia Cos., Exchange Act Release No. 75837, 2015 WL 5172953, at *2, 23
(Sept. 3, 2015).
See Public Statement, SEC, Opinion of Commissioner Gallagher and Commissioner
Piwowar, Dissenting from the Opinion of the Commission (Oct. 2, 2015),
http://www.sec.gov/news/statement/dissenting-opinion-gallagher-piwowar.html (“Even
though the Commission is free to express its views on Constitutional issues, we recognize
and believe it is appropriate that Article III federal judges ultimately resolve this issue.”).
Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, 832 F.3d 277, 280, 289, 296 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
See, e.g., cases cited supra note 53.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a)(1) (2012) (“A person aggrieved by a final order of the Commission
entered pursuant to this chapter may obtain review in the United States Court of
Appeals.”).
See generally Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938); see also Sims v.
Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 110 (2000) (“Where the parties are expected to develop the issues in
an adversarial administrative proceeding, it seems to us that the rationale for requiring
issue exhaustion is at its greatest.”); McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 194 (1969)
(“[I]t is normally desirable to let the agency develop the necessary factual background
upon which decisions should be based. . . . The courts ordinarily should not interfere
with an agency until it has completed its action, or else has clearly exceeded its
jurisdiction.”).
See generally Jarkesy v. SEC, 803 F.3d 9 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Bebo v. SEC, 799 F.3d 765 (7th
Cir. 2015).
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Second and Eleventh Circuits found no jurisdiction, and an appeal before
63
the Fourth Circuit is still pending. The Fourth Circuit declined to stay
64
agency proceedings pending the outcome of the appeal.
When gauging the persuasiveness of the decisions that ruled on the
jurisdictional question, it is helpful to distinguish between those cases that
have raised Appointments Clause challenges and those that have not. The
former cases more convincingly can claim to be wholly collateral to the
agency hearing and outside its scope of expertise, as I argue below.
Courts have been less willing to find jurisdiction in cases that lack an
65
Appointments Clause challenge. Courts have ruled that jurisdiction does
not exist in cases raising Due Process or Equal Protection challenges because
they are not collateral to the suit or outside the scope of the SEC’s expertise,
and “a finding of preclusion does not foreclose all meaningful judicial
66
review,” since an appellate court can remand the case if it finds that Due
67
Process was not afforded.
68
Beginning in mid-2015, SEC litigants regularly challenged the
constitutionality of the ALJs’ appointments, which some district courts have

63

64
65

66
67

68

See generally Tilton v. SEC, 824 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 2016) (“Tilton II”); Hill v. SEC, 825 F.3d
1236 (11th Cir. 2016) (“Hill II”); Notice of Appeal, Bennett v. SEC, 2016 WL 7321231
(4th Cir. Dec. 21, 2015) (No. 15-2584).
Order, Bennett, 2016 WL 7321231, (No. 15-2584) (“Upon consideration . . . the court
denies the motion to expedite and for injunctive relief pending appeal.”).
See Jarkesy, 803 F.3d at 20–22 (noting that, unlike in Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co.
Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 496 (2010), plaintiff “would not have to erect a
Trojan-horse challenge to an SEC rule or ‘bet the farm’ by subjecting himself to
unnecessary sanction under the securities laws” and that his claims concerned
“substantive or procedural deficiencies in the Commission’s enforcement of the securities
laws against him,” which were not collateral to the proceeding); Bebo, 799 F.3d at 775
(“We see no evidence from the statute’s text, structure, and purpose that Congress
intended for plaintiffs like Bebo who are already subject to ongoing administrative
enforcement proceedings to be able to stop those proceedings by challenging the
constitutionality of the enabling legislation or the structural authority of the SEC.”); Chau
v. SEC, 72 F. Supp. 3d 417, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“This Court’s jurisdiction is not an
escape hatch for litigants to delay or derail an administrative action when statutory
channels of review are entirely adequate.”). But see Gupta v. SEC, 796 F. Supp. 2d 503,
513–14 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (denying a motion to dismiss an equal protection claim on the
grounds that the complaint “would state a claim even if Gupta were entirely guilty of the
charges made against him” because his claims were wholly collateral to the underlying
insider trading allegations).
Bebo, 799 F.3d at 767.
See Jarkesy, 803 F.3d at 22 (“[S]hould the record in the administrative proceeding prove
inadequate to the court of appeals considering his attacks on the Commission’s final
order, that court always has the option of remanding to the agency for further factual
development.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Allison Frankel, Skadden’s New Theory on Why SEC In-House Judges Are Unconstitutional,
REUTERS (Apr. 2, 2015), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2015/04/02/skaddensnew-theory-on-why-sec-in-house-judges-are-unconstitutional.
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69

Because the Appointments
found sufficient to establish jurisdiction.
Clause challenge is less clearly connected to any aspect of the underlying
substantive claims, it has a stronger argument that the issue is not one
Congress intended to limit from a district court’s jurisdiction. Indeed, the
plaintiff in Hill v. SEC tried to raise the challenge before an ALJ, but the ALJ
ruled that he lacked the authority to rule on it and, as such, the plaintiff was
forced either to wait for a final ruling—without the chance to have his
70
constitutional challenge heard—or to seek an injunction in federal court.
Further, appellate review of a final SEC order offers no relief, since, as
plaintiffs argue, they “will have already suffered an irreparable injury by the
time he gets to the Court of Appeals on account of enduring an
71
unconstitutional administrative hearing.”
In Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, the Supreme Court discussed several
considerations that are useful in determining whether Congress intended to
foreclose district court jurisdiction over a collateral constitutional challenge
72
or to allow a litigant to bypass the administrative process. As instructed in
Thunder Basin, a court may assume that Congress did not intend to limit
jurisdiction if “a finding of preclusion could foreclose all meaningful judicial
review,” if the issue is “‘wholly collateral’ to a statute’s review provisions,”
73
and if the substance of the claim lies “outside the agency’s expertise.” The
Court also emphasized that “[w]hether a statute is intended to preclude
initial judicial review is determined from the statute’s language, structure,
74
and purpose.”
The Court recently employed this test in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co.
75
Accounting Oversight Board and in Elgin v. Department of the Treasury,
76
separating the considerations into three distinct factors. The reasoning
employed in both cases is instructive in trying to determine how the Court

69

70
71

72
73
74
75
76

See Hill v. SEC, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1305–10 (N.D. Ga. 2015) (“Hill I”) (finding the
plaintiff’s Appointments Clause claim gave rise to subject-matter jurisdiction because the
plaintiff did not merely challenge the propriety of the SEC’s decision, but disputed the
SEC’s constitutional authority).
Brief of Appellee at 4, Hill v. SEC, 825 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2016) (“Hill II”) (No. 1512831).
Id. at 16; cf. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 330 (1976) (holding that jurisdiction is
proper where the “constitutional challenge is entirely collateral to [the] substantive claim
of entitlement”).
Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 207–18 (1994).
Id. at 212–13.
Id. at 207.
Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 496 (2010); Elgin v.
Dep’t of the Treasury,132 S. Ct. 2126, 2133–36 (2012).
Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. 477, 489 (2010).
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would rule in the matter of the SEC’s ALJs. Tilton v. SEC and Hill also
77
referenced these cases to help them decide this issue.

1. Meaningful Judicial Review
Meaningful judicial review is the most difficult factor on which to predict
how the Court would rule and likely would determine the outcome of the
challenge. As in Free Enterprise, the appeals statute in question is 15 U.S.C. §
78
78y. In Free Enterprise, the Court ruled that no meaningful judicial review
79
existed.
There, petitioners were subject to an investigation, but the
80
PCAOB ultimately did not issue any sanctions.
As such, there was no
81
opportunity to challenge its constitutionality.
The Court rejected the
government’s argument that the plaintiffs lacked jurisdiction because they
82
needed to wait for an adverse ruling. The Court ruled that no “meaningful
avenue of relief” exists where a plaintiff must “bet the farm . . . by taking the
83
violative action before testing the validity of the law.”
The case of the SEC’s ALJs is distinguishable from Free Enterprise because,
here, the SEC already had initiated enforcement actions against each
plaintiff. Thus, the only measurable harm the current plaintiffs would incur
by having to first undergo an agency proceeding is the expense of litigation,
84
which is insufficient to establish jurisdiction.
Moreover, as the Second
Circuit noted in Tilton II, “some—but not all—of the PCAOB’s regulatory
actions required SEC approval in the form of a final Commission order.”85
Thus not all PCAOB action was subject to the appeals process described
86
under § 78y, which only covers Commission orders.
This is seemingly
distinguishable from the present case where every ALJ decision is subject to
review by the Commission and, ultimately, a federal court of appeals.
Plaintiffs also cite to McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center for the proposition
that just because a statute requires exhaustion of administrative remedies,
that does not necessarily mean that the act encompasses “general collateral

77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84

85
86

See generally Tilton v. SEC, 824 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 2016) (“Tilton II”); Hill v. SEC, 825 F.3d
1236 (11th Cir. 2016) (“Hill II”).
Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 489; Hill II, 825 F.3d at 1242.
Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 490.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 490–91 (internal quotation marks omitted).
See Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1, 24 (1974) (“Mere litigation
expense, even substantial and unrecoupable cost, does not constitute irreparable
injury.”).
Tilton v. SEC, 824 F.3d 276, 283 (2d Cir. 2016) (“Tilton II”).
Id.
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87

challenges to unconstitutional practices and policies.” However, McNary is
factually distinguishable from the present cases and is more closely
analogous to Free Enterprise. In McNary, undocumented workers sought to
challenge the denial of special worker status, but the agency only permitted
challenges to that classification in deportation hearings, which would force
individuals to “surrender themselves for deportation” in order to obtain a
88
decision. That is akin to having to “bet the farm by taking the violative
action,” which, under Free Enterprise, is not an avenue for meaningful
89
review.
Here, the Eleventh Circuit and a divided Second Circuit held that there
90
was an opportunity for meaningful review, which the latter referred to as
91
“the ‘most important’ Thunder Basin factor.” These two courts disagreed
with district courts that had reasoned that no meaningful review existed
because litigants would still be required to undergo the very hearing whose
constitutionality they were challenging and they would have already suffered
the alleged harm, regardless of the outcome of the proceeding or a later
92
appeal. The Tilton dissent agreed that no meaningful review existed and
also noted that because most claims end in settlement, “it might well be that
93
choosing to litigate is, in fact, equivalent to ‘betting the farm.’”
In reversing the lower courts, these Circuit Courts relied on Elgin to
94
support that no jurisdiction exists. However, Elgin, like Free Enterprise, is
distinguishable. In Elgin, the Court found that a district court lacked
95
jurisdiction because review was available in the Federal Circuit. Under the
Civil Service Reform Act (“CSRA”), federal employees are permitted to
“obtain administrative and judicial review of specified adverse employment
96
97
actions.”
Following a hearing before an ALJ, any employee “against

87
88
89
90
91
92

93
94

95
96
97

See, e.g., Brief of Appellee at 21, Hill v. SEC, 825 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2016) (“Hill II”)
(No. 15-12831) (quoting McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., 498 U.S. 479, 494 (1991)).
McNary, 498 U.S. at 496–97.
Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 490–91 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Hill II, 825 F.3d at 1250; Tilton II, 824 F.3d at 283, 87.
Tilton II, 824 F.3d at 282 (quoting Bebo v. SEC, 799 F.3d 765, 774–75 (7th Cir. 2015)).
See Gray Fin. Grp. v. SEC, 166 F. Supp. 3d 1335, 1345 (N.D. Ga. 2015) (“Because the
courts of appeals cannot enjoin an unconstitutional administrative proceeding which has
already occurred, those claims would be moot and the meaningful review Thunder Basin
contemplates would be missing.”); Duka v. SEC, 103 F. Supp. 3d 382, 391 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)
(“Simply put, there would be no proceeding to enjoin.”).
Tilton II, 824 F.3d at 298 n.5 (2d. Cir. 2016) (Droney, J., dissenting) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Id. at 279, 287–91 (majority opinion) (agreeing with the district court below when it “relied in part on Elgin” to determine that it lacked jurisdiction and citing Elgin in deciding
two of the three Thunder Basin factors).
Elgin v. Dep’t of the Treasury, 132 S. Ct. 2126, 2139 (2012).
Id. at 2130.
Id. at 2131.
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whom an action is taken” may obtain internal review and, if “aggrieved by a
98
In Elgin,
final order,” may appeal exclusively to the Federal Circuit.
petitioners were former federal employees who were fired for failing to
comply with the Military Selective Service Act and as a result, were statutorily
99
barred from federal employment in executive agencies.
Due to this
absolute statutory bar on federal employment, the ALJ dismissed the claim
100
for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioners then sought a declaratory judgment in
district court rather than challenge the ruling before the Merit Systems
101
Protection Board (“MSPB”) or in the Federal Circuit.
Elgin held that
meaningful review was available in the Federal Circuit, “an Article III court
fully competent to adjudicate petitioners’ claims that Section 3328 and the
Military
Selective
Service
Act’s
registration
requirement
are
102
unconstitutional.”
Unlike Elgin, the challenge here is not to any SEC ALJ decision, but to
the constitutionality of the proceeding itself, in light of the ALJ’s defective
appointment. By contrast, in Elgin, petitioners challenged an ALJ’s
determination that he lacked jurisdiction and they were arguing that the
ALJ should hear their claims. If, on appeal, the Federal Circuit had found
that jurisdiction existed, petitioners would not have contested the agency
proceeding. Thus, there are ways to distinguish Free Enterprise, McNary and
Elgin and a colorable argument exists for both sides. Nonetheless, it is not
clear that litigants have met the high bar needed to establish that
meaningful review does not exist. In sum, “post-proceeding relief, although
103
imperfect, suffices to vindicate the litigant’s constitutional claim” since a
court of appeals can “vacate a Commission order in whole, relieving the
104
respondents of any liability.” Ultimately, it is uncertain how the Court will
rule.

2. Wholly Collateral
The Court is likely to find that the Appointments Clause challenge is
wholly collateral to the underlying SEC action. In Free Enterprise, the Court
held that a wholly collateral attack not challenging any particular agency
98
99
100
101
102
103

104

Id. at 2134.
Id. at 2131.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2137.
Tilton v. SEC, 824 F.3d. 276, 285 (2d Cir. 2016) (“Tilton II”). But see id. at 299 (Droney,
J., dissenting) (arguing that Free Enterprise “considers the very process of enforcement by an
unconstitutional body to be an injury that can be relevant to the determination of
whether post-proceeding review is ‘meaningful’”).
Hill v. SEC, 825 F.3d 1236, 1247 (11th Cir. 2016) (“Hill II”) (citing 15 U.S.C. §
78y(a)(3)).
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ruling may be brought prior to the exhaustion of administrative remedies.
The Court rejected the government’s argument that plaintiffs could have
and should have challenged in an agency hearing the PCAOB’s “auditing
standards, registration requirements, or other rules,” since the objection was
106
“to the Board’s existence, not to any of its auditing standards.”
In Elgin,
the challenge was not wholly collateral because the “petitioners’
constitutional claims are the vehicle by which they seek to reverse the
removal decisions, to return to federal employment, and to receive the
compensation,” which “is precisely the type of personnel action regularly
adjudicated by the MSPB and the Federal Circuit within the CSRA
107
scheme.”
Here, as in Free Enterprise, the challengers object to the very
existence of the proceeding, not to any specific decision or rule, which is a
wholly collateral issue.
Hill held that that this factor and the next “do not cut strongly either
108
way,” whereas Tilton held that “a claim is not wholly collateral if it has been
raised in response to, and so is procedurally intertwined with, an
administrative proceeding—regardless of the claim’s substantive connection
109
to the initial merits dispute.”
However, as the Tilton dissent persuasively
argued, the majority improperly focused on the procedural—rather than the
substantive—merits of the constitutional claim, which runs contrary to the
110
Court’s analysis in Thunder Basin, Free Enterprise, and Elgin.
The dissent
further noted that if—as the majority held—no challenge that could end an
ongoing agency proceeding could ever be considered wholly collateral, that
interpretation “would swallow the rule, for there would no longer be any
need to evaluate the substance of a claim as long as the claim could
111
somehow serve to end administrative proceedings in a plaintiff’s favor.”
Unlike Elgin, where the claim related to the substance of the act itself, here,
the Appointments Clause claim has nothing to do with the enforcement of
securities law and is wholly collateral.

3. Outside the Agency’s Expertise
The Court is also likely to find that this challenge is outside the SEC’s
expertise. The Appointments Clause claim—unlike a ruling on a subpoena

105
106
107
108
109
110
111

See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 489 (2010)
(“The Government [incorrectly] reads § 78y as an exclusive route to review.”).
Id. at 490.
Elgin, 132 S. Ct. at 2139–40.
Hill II, 825 F.3d at 1250.
Tilton v. SEC, 824 F.3d 276, 287 (2d Cir. 2016) (“Tilton II”).
Id. at 292 (Droney, J., dissenting).
Id. at 295.
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112

or a discovery motion, among others —is not within the SEC’s expertise of
investigating securities fraud or insider trading allegations, as even courts
113
that found no jurisdiction have held.
Rather, “the statutory questions
involved do not require ‘technical considerations of [agency] policy’ [and]
114
are instead standard questions of administrative law.” Tilton and Hill held
that the SEC could bring its general expertise to bear by finding that no
securities violation occurred, which would moot the Appointments Clause
115
claim.
But that reasoning is unconvincing, since it ignores the merits of
the underlying challenge and focuses only on the merits of the securities
claim with no clear basis that that interpretation is consistent with Supreme
Court precedent.

4. Weighing the Thunder Basin Factors
To date, no court has ruled on how much weight to give each Thunder
Basin factor, which will be necessary if the factors are not decided the same
116
way.
If, as Tilton and Hill argue, the meaningful judicial review factor is
the most important, the Court may find no jurisdiction. If, however, they
are to be weighed equally, then jurisdiction may exist.

B. Determining Whether SEC ALJs Are Inferior Officers
This section addresses whether ALJs are inferior officers or mere
employees, since the Appointments Clause is only relevant if they are
inferior officers. Because the SEC readily concedes that it does not appoint
117
its ALJs, if SEC ALJs are inferior officers—as this Comment argues they
may be—then their appointments violate the Appointments Clause.
The Constitution states that the President:

112

113

114
115
116

117

Cf. Chau v. SEC, 72 F. Supp. 3d 417, 428 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“[The plaintiffs’] due process
claim has been that the SEC’s procedural rules . . . are unfair in light of the facts and
circumstances of [their] case.”) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
See Tilton v. SEC, No. 15-CV-2472-RA, 2015 WL 4006165, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2015)
(“Tilton I”) (“[T]he particular constitutional questions here may not be within the SEC’s
expertise.”).
Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 491 (2010)
(quoting Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 373 (1974) (first alteration in original)).
Hill v. SEC, 825 F.3d 1236, 1250 (11th Cir. 2016) (“Hill II”); Tilton v. SEC, 824 F.3d 276,
290 (2d Cir. 2016) (“Tilton II”).
Cf. Tilton II, 824 F.3d at 299 (Droney, J., dissenting) (“I am unpersuaded that the
‘meaningful judicial review’ prong has enough weight to overpower the other two factors
and result in a finding of no jurisdiction.”)
See Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, 832 F.3d 277, 283 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“The Commission
has acknowledged the ALJ was not appointed as the Clause requires . . . .”).
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shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,
shall
appoint . . . Officers
of
the
United
States,
whose
Appointments . . . shall be established by Law; but the Congress may by
Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper,
in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of
118
Departments.

In Free Enterprise, the Court held that “[b]ecause the Commission [SEC]
is a freestanding component of the Executive Branch, not subordinate to or
contained within any other such component, it constitutes a ‘Department’
119
for the purposes of the Appointments Clause.”
Even assuming ALJs are
inferior officers, had the Commissioners appointed its ALJs there would be
no constitutional infirmity; however, the SEC does not, in fact, appoint its
ALJs.
Officers exercise “significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United
120
States.”
The President appoints principal officers “with the advice and
121
consent of the Senate.”
The difference between an inferior officer and a
122
principal officer has not been fully clarified, but the distinction is not
crucial for this Comment. That is because ALJs’ initial decisions are
reviewed de novo by the Commissioners, thus ALJs are at most inferior
123
officers. Of note, “Heads of Departments” may appoint inferior officers.
By contrast, “[e]mployees are lesser functionaries subordinate to officers,”
124
and may be hired in any manner the agency decides.
In Free Enterprise, the dissent listed positions that the Supreme Court has
125
previously found to be inferior officers.
Although the majority
126
sidestepped whether ALJs are inferior officers, the dissent argued that
118
119

120
121
122

123
124
125

126

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
561 U.S. at 511 (internal alteration omitted); see also Kent Barnett, Resolving the ALJ
Quandary, 66 VAND. L. REV. 797, 810 (2013) (noting that not all executive agencies are
also departments).
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976) (per curiam).
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
See Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 661 (1997) (“Our cases have not set forth an
exclusive criterion for distinguishing between principal and inferior officers . . . .”); Nick
Bravin, Note, Is Morrison v. Olson Still Good Law? The Court’s New Appointments Clause
Jurisprudence, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1103, 1114 (1998) (“Early Supreme Court attempts to
define the term ‘officer’ provide inexact, if any, judicially manageable standards.”).
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126 n.162.
See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 540 (2010)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court had previously held that “officers” included
a district court clerk, clerks in various executive departments, an assistant treasurer’s
clerk, an assistant surgeon, a cadet-engineer, election monitors, United States attorneys,
federal marshals, military judges, Article I judges, and the Department of
Transportation’s general counsel, among others).
See id. at 507 n.10 (“[O]ur holding . . . does not address that subset of independent
agency employees who serve as administrative law judges. . . . Whether administrative law
judges are necessarily ‘Officers of the United States’ is disputed.”) (majority opinion).
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“[r]eading the criteria above as stringently as possible, I still see no way to
avoid sweeping hundreds, perhaps thousands of high-level Government
officials within the scope of the Court’s holding, putting their job security
127
and their administrative actions and decisions constitutionally at risk.”
In Morrison v. Olson, the Supreme Court attempted to delineate certain
factors that are relevant to determine an individual’s constitutional status.
The Court held that no Appointments Clause violation existed with respect
128
to an independent counsel who was appointed by a “Court[] of Law” to
investigate and prosecute high-ranking government officials, since she was
an inferior officer—not a principal officer—and did not need to be
129
appointed with the advice and consent of the Senate.
To determine an
officer’s status, the Supreme Court identified four core factors to consider:
removability by a higher executive branch official; empowerment to perform
130
only limited duties; limited jurisdiction; and limited tenure. However, the
Court did not apply the factors, stating that “[w]e need not attempt here to
decide exactly where the line falls between the two types of officers, because
131
in our view appellant clearly falls on the ‘inferior officer’ side of that line.”
Less than ten years later, in Edmond v. United States, the Court returned to
this issue and defined an inferior officer as one “whose work is directed and
supervised at some level by others who were appointed by Presidential
132
nomination with the advice and consent of the Senate.”
The Court ruled
that Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals judges were inferior officers,
since, among other reasons, the Judge Advocate General and the Court of
133
Appeals for the Armed Forces supervised them.
Unlike Morrison and Edmond, which differentiated between principal and
134
inferior officers, Freytag v. Commissioner distinguished between an inferior
officer and an employee and focused on the “degree of authority exercised”
135
and, secondarily, on the ability to render a final decision.
In Raymond J.
136
Lucia Cos. v. SEC, the D.C. Circuit became the first appellate court to apply
this test to SEC ALJs. However, Lucia created its own test for who is an
inferior officer that, this Comment argues, is not entirely consistent with the

127
128
129
130
131

132
133
134
135
136

Id. at 540–41 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 671, 676 (1988).
Bravin, supra note 122, at 1116 (citing Morrison, 487 U.S. at 671–72).
Morrison, 487 U.S. at 671. Indeed, the dissent criticized this lack of guidance and its
failure to consider the separation-of-powers concerns that would arise from the decision.
Id. at 704 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
520 U.S. 651, 663 (1997).
Id. at 664, 666.
501 U.S. 868 (1991).
Id. at 880–82.
832 F.3d 277 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
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test articulated by the Supreme Court in Freytag. Lucia stated that “the main
criteria for drawing the line between inferior Officers and employees not
covered by the Clause are (1) the significance of the matters resolved by the
officials, (2) the discretion they exercise in reaching their decisions, and (3)
137
the finality of those decisions.” However, Freytag placed a greater emphasis
138
on the first two factors only.

1. ALJs Wield Considerable Discretion
In Freytag, the Court determined that Tax Court Special Trial Judges
(“STJs”), who could be appointed by the Tax Court Chief Judge and who
139
were tasked with assisting Tax Court judges, were inferior officers.
The
Court reasoned that STJs were inferior officers because “the degree of
authority exercised . . . [was] so significant that it was inconsistent with the
140
classification of lesser functionaries or employees.”
Although the
government argued that STJs “lack[ed] authority to enter a final decision” in
certain cases, the Court found that “this argument ignores the significance
141
of the duties and discretion that special trial judges possess.”
The Court
noted that “[t]he office of special trial judge is established by Law,” and that
STJs “perform more than ministerial tasks. They take testimony, conduct
trials, rule on the admissibility of evidence, and have the power to enforce
compliance with discovery orders. In the course of carrying out these
important functions, the special trial judges exercise significant
142
discretion.”
In Landry v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., the D.C. Circuit applied Freytag
to address whether Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) ALJs
143
are inferior officers.
The court recognized that, like Freytag’s STJs, an
ALJ’s position is “established by Law, as are its specific duties, salary, and
144
means of appointment.” Further, ALJs also “take testimony, conduct trials,
rule on the admissibility of evidence, and have the power to enforce
compliance with discovery orders . . . [and] exercise significant
145
discretion.”

137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145

Id. at 285 (quoting Tucker v. Comm’r, 676 F.3d 1129, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 2012)).
Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881.
Id. 880–82.
Id. at 881 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id. at 881–82 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
204 F.3d 1125, 1130–32 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
Id. at 1133 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 1134 (quoting Freytag, 501 U.S. 881–82); see also 17 C.F.R. § 200.14(a) (1995)
(denoting the power that ALJs have when conducting agencies hearings); Barnett, supra
note 119, at 811–12 (describing the powers that ALJs yield).
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Although Landry ultimately held that ALJs are not inferior officers, there
are reasons both to distinguish between SEC ALJs and FDIC ALJs and to
question whether Landry was correctly decided, as discussed in more detail
in the next subsection.
Landry recognized that FDIC ALJs wield considerable authority, similar
to that exercised by STJs. Nonetheless, it distinguished between STJs and
ALJs, reasoning that STJs could sometimes render final decisions, whereas
ALJs could issue only “recommended findings of fact” and “recommended
146
conclusions of law.”
Further, Landry noted that an STJ’s factual findings
cannot be overturned unless they are clearly erroneous, whereas FDIC ALJs’
147
factual findings are reviewed de novo.
Unlike the Landry majority, the concurrence argued that “[t]here are no
relevant differences” between the functions of ALJs and STJs, recognizing
that the Supreme Court did not make rendering final decisions a necessary
148
condition for inferior officer status.
Like STJs, ALJs are established by
149
150
law and wield considerable authority and discretion, which, it argued,
151
was a more important consideration to the Freytag Court.
SEC ALJs wield significant power—inconsistent with that of an
employee—and they decide important agency matters. They
(1) Administer oaths and affirmations; (2) Issue subpoenas; (3) Rule on
offers of proof; (4) Examine witnesses; (5) Regulate the course of a
hearing; (6) Hold pre-hearing conferences; (7) Rule upon motions; and
(8) . . . prepare an initial decision containing the conclusions as to the
152
factual and legal issues presented, and issue an appropriate order.

Because SEC ALJs exercise comparable discretion with respect to STJs, they
153
satisfy the first two Lucia elements that were focal to Freytag’s holding.
Thus, it is arguable that they, too, are inferior officers.
Notably, the D.C. Circuit in Lucia, relying largely on Landry, held that
154
SEC ALJs are not inferior officers.
However, that court did not devote
significant space to the issue of ALJ discretion. Rather, much of its analysis
146
147
148
149
150

151

152
153
154

Landry, 204 F.3d at 1133 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Id. (citing Tax Ct. R. 183(c)).
Id. at 1141 (Randolph, J., concurring).
17 C.F.R. § 200.14 (1995).
See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978) (“[T]he role of the
modern . . . administrative law judge . . . is ‘functionally comparable’ to that of a judge.”);
see also Barnett, supra note 119, at 798 (noting that the function of ALJs “closely parallels
that of Article III judges”).
Landry, 204 F.3d at 1142 (“It is true that the Supreme Court relied on this consideration;
the last paragraph of the opinion quoted above indicates as much. What the majority
neglects to mention is that the Court clearly designated this as an alternative holding.”)
17 C.F.R. § 200.14(a) (1995).
See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
See Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, 832 F.3d 277, 285 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“Landry is the law of
the circuit.”).
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focused on the finality issue and the scope of the Commission’s review,
which are discussed in the following section.

2. That ALJs’ Decisions Lack Finality and Are Reviewed De Novo Is Not
Dispositive of Whether They Are Inferior Officers
An adjudicator may still be an inferior officer even if his or her decisions
are reviewed de novo and the decisions are not summarily final. Moreover,
they are not required elements, contrary to Lucia’s reading of Freytag.
a. Finality Is Not a Required Element of Inferior Officer Status
In Freytag, the Court buttressed its conclusion that STJs were inferior
officers by noting that even if STJs’ duties “under subsection (b)(4) were not
as significant as we . . . have found them to be, our conclusion would be
unchanged[,]” since under other parts of the statutory scheme, “the Chief
155
Judge may assign [STJs] to render the decisions of the Tax Court.” Thus,
even for the hearings over which an STJ could not render a final decision
and for which he was a “mere employee with respect to [those]
responsibilities,” that did not “transform his status [as an inferior officer]
156
under the Constitution.”
While suggesting that final decision-making
authority may be sufficient to make someone an inferior officer, this dictum
does not suggest that finality is necessary.
The Supreme Court in Freytag focused first and foremost on “the
significance of the duties and discretion” that STJs exercised, as did the
157
Landry concurrence.
The Landry concurrence emphasized that an ALJ’s
discretion and authority—not its ability to render final decisions—is central
to the determination that an ALJ is an inferior officer, and the fact that its
decisions are reviewed by the agency “shows only that the ALJ shares the
158
common characteristic of an ‘inferior Officer.’” Accordingly, it appears—
as some commenters have argued—that the Landry concurrence “had the
159
better argument,” and that final decision making authority, although
highly relevant, is not dispositive. The Landry majority’s reading of Freytag
160
and its reliance on Freytag’s dictum seem misplaced.

155
156
157
158
159
160

Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 882 (1991).
Id.
Id. at 881.
Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1142 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Randolph, J., concurring).
Barnett, supra note 119, at 813.
Indeed, this reading of Freytag is inconsistent with Edmond, which held that a judge was an
inferior officer even though he “ha[d] no power to render a final decision . . . unless
permitted to do so by other Executive officers.” 520 U.S. 651, 665 (1997). Although Free
Enterprise mentioned Landry, it declined to follow or reject it, simply citing it for the
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Nonetheless, the D.C. Circuit in Landry emphasized the fact that STJs
could render final decisions in delineated instances and used that to
161
distinguish them from FDIC ALJs, ignoring the central part of Freytag’s
holding. Similarly, the D.C. Circuit in Lucia emphasized the lack of finality
162
in its determination that SEC ALJs are not inferior officers.
Even if Landry was correctly decided, SEC ALJs arguably can be
distinguished from FDIC ALJs.
FDIC ALJs render “recommendary
163
decisions,” which “always require further agency action.”
By contrast, in
certain instances an SEC ALJ’s decision can become the final agency
164
decision. Although this distinction appears compelling, the court in Lucia
dismissed it, finding that “the difference between the FDIC’s recommended
165
decisions and the Commission’s initial decisions is illusory.”
It further
stressed that the SEC “has retained full decision-making powers” and that an
ALJ’s initial decision becomes final “when, and only when, the Commission
166
issues the finality order.”
Thus, ALJs do not have the power “to act
independently of the Commission, nor . . . do they have the power to bind
167
third parties.” However, Lucia’s holding too quickly dismisses the fact that
the SEC has the discretion to decline to review a decision in which there is
168
no clearly erroneous factual or legal conclusion, unlike the FDIC.
This
suggests that there is some meaningful distinction between the finality of an
SEC ALJ’s decision and that of an FDIC ALJ’s.
b. The SEC’s Scope of Review over an ALJ’s Decision Does Not
Render ALJs Employees
Additionally, the scope of review was not focal to Freytag’s inferior officer
analysis. Nonetheless, Landry distinguished the scope and depth of review
for STJ and ALJ non-final decisions to support its holding that ALJs are not

161
162
163
164

165
166
167
168

proposition that whether ALJs are inferior officers was “disputed.” 561 U.S. 477, 507 n.10
(2010).
See Landry, 204 F.3d at 1134 (arguing that “in another way the [Supreme] Court laid
exceptional stress on the STJs’ final decisionmaking power”).
Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, 832 F.3d 277, 284–88 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
Timbervest, LLC v. SEC, 1:15–CV–2106–LMM, 2015 WL 7597428, at *10 (N.D. Ga. Aug.
4, 2015) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2012)).
17 C.F.R. § 201.360(d)(2) (1995) (“If a party or aggrieved person entitled to review fails
to file timely a petition for review or a motion to correct a manifest error of fact in the
initial decision, and if the Commission does not order review of a decision on its own
initiative, the Commission will issue an order that the decision has become final as to that
party.”); see 17 C.F.R. § 201.411(e) (1995) (stating that for ALJ decisions not subject to
mandatory review, “the Commission may summarily affirm an initial decision”).
Lucia, 832 F.3d at 287 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 286.
Id.
17 C.F.R. § 201.411(b)(2) (1995).

544

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 19:2

inferior officers. Landry noted that, under the Tax Court rules, when
reviewing an STJ’s recommendation, “[d]ue regard shall be given to the
circumstance that the [STJ] had the opportunity to evaluate the credibility
of witnesses, and the findings of fact recommended by the [STJ] shall be
169
Landry also cited to Edmond, where the Court
presumed to be correct.”
determined that military judges were inferior officers because “so long as
there is some competent evidence . . . to establish each element of the
offense beyond a reasonable doubt, the Court of Appeals for the Armed
Forces will not reevaluate the facts,” suggesting a very narrow scope of
170
review.
By contrast, the FDIC Board may review “the entire record of the
171
proceeding.” Here, the SEC Commission may set aside an initial decision
based on “its judgment [of what is] proper and on the basis of the record,”
172
which suggests a less deferential standard of review than in Freytag.
As
Lucia also noted, “[i]n either the FDIC or [SEC] system, issues of law and
fact can go unreviewed,” which supports the SEC’s position that there is not
173
as great a difference between the FDIC and SEC as has been argued.
However, Landry and Lucia’s emphasis on the scope of review arguably is
misplaced, given that it was not a focal part of Freytag’s analysis and, indeed,
174
was not even relevant to the Supreme Court’s granting of certiorari.
Moreover, the FDIC and SEC scope of review can be distinguished.
Unlike the FDIC, the SEC does not review each initial decision de novo.
Rather, it exercises discretion over how much and how searching a review to
175
conduct.
The SEC may summarily affirm an initial decision if it believes
that no further consideration is necessary, at which point the ALJ’s decision
176
becomes the SEC’s final order.
Nonetheless, Lucia argued that the SEC’s
177
“scope of review is no more deferential than that of the FDIC Board.” But
unlike the SEC, the FDIC must review all FDIC ALJ decisions, whereas,
approximately 90% of the SEC’s ALJs’ initial decisions in 2014 and 2015
178
were not reviewed by the Commission.
That SEC hearings may be

169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178

Tax Ct. R. 183.
Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 665 (1997).
12 C.F.R. § 308.40(c)(1) (1995) (cited in Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1133 (D.C. Cir.
2000)).
17 C.F.R. § 201.411(a) (1995).
Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, 832 F.3d 277, 287–88 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
See Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 874 n.3 (1991) (noting that the standard of review
was “not relevant to [the Court’s] grant of certiorari”).
17 C.F.R. § 201.411(a)–(d) (1995).
Id. § 201.411(e).
Lucia, 832 F.3d at 288.
Brief of Appellants at 30–31, Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, 832 F.3d 277 (D.C. Cir. 2016)
(No. 15-1345).
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presided over by either ALJs or the Commission further exemplifies the
179
power ALJs possess.
Further, it is not clear that the distinction concerning the scope of review
necessarily renders an ALJ a mere employee. As the Court held in Edmond,
agency adjudicators can be inferior officers even if they “have no power to
180
render a final decision.”
Accordingly, the Landry concurrence found the
different scope of review to be “no distinction at all,” opining that review by
181
a principal officer would merely render FDIC ALJs inferior officers.
Nonetheless, Lucia—like Landry—stressed that ALJs operate under the
control of their agencies and were intended to be accountable to their
182
agencies.
But the mere fact that ALJs operate under the control of an
Officer does not determine whether they are employees or inferior officers.
Importantly, even where review is de novo, deference is still given to an
183
ALJ’s credibility determination.
In general, when an agency reviews a
hearing officer’s decision, it defers to the officer’s credibility findings unless
184
the statute or regulation provides otherwise. Such a determination can be

179

180

181
182
183
184

See 15 U.S.C. § 77u (2012) (“All hearings . . . may be held before the Commission or an
officer or officers of the Commission designated by it.”); 17 C.F.R. § 201.101(a)(5) (1995)
(“Hearing officer means an administrative law judge, a panel of Commissioners
constituting less than a quorum of the Commission, [or] an individual Commissioner.”).
As the Hill brief noted, the SEC’s website used to refer to ALJs as “independent judicial
officers.” See Brief of Appellee at 42 n.15, Hill v. SEC, 825 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2015)
(No.
15-12831)
(quoting
SEC,
Office
of
Administrative Law
Judges,
http://www.sec.gov/alj). Interestingly, that description has since been modified and now
defines ALJs as “independent adjudicators.” SEC, Office of Administrative Law Judges,
http://www.sec.gov/alj (last visited Oct. 30, 2016). On the other hand, the SEC states
that the use of the term “hearing officer” does not mean Congress intended ALJs to be
“Officers of the United States.” See Brief of Appellee at 41–42 n.7, Tilton v. SEC, 824 F.3d
276 (2d Cir. 2015) (“Tilton II”) (No. 15-2103). The D.C. Circuit agreed. See Lucia, 832
F.3d at 289 (noting that the statutory reference to “‘officers of the Commission’ in 15
U.S.C. § 77u” does not mean that “Congress intended these officers to be synonymous
with ‘Officers of the United States’ under the Appointments Clause”). This argument
seems compelling, since the APA refers to one who renders an initial decision as a
“presiding employee.” See 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556, & 557 (2012).
Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 665 (1997). In keeping with this test, the
Supreme Court in Ryder v. United States noted that appellate military judges were inferior
officers. 515 U.S. 177, 180 (1995).
Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1142 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Randolph, J., concurring).
Lucia, 832 F.3d at 288–89.
See Landry, 204 F.3d at 1143 n.3 (Randolph, J., concurring) (emphasizing that “[d]e novo
review does not mean that the ALJ’s recommended decisions are without influence”).
See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 496 (1951) (stating that when the
factfinder and the reviewing body reach opposite conclusions on a witness’s credibility,
deference should be given to “an impartial, experienced examiner who has observed the
witnesses and lived with the case [and] has drawn conclusions different from the
Board’s”); Bosma v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 754 F.2d 804, 808 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that
where “credibility is at issue or when findings of motive or purpose depend entirely on
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overcome “only where the record contains substantial evidence for doing
185
Indeed, the SEC itself has stated that it defers to its ALJs’ credibility
so.”
186
findings “absent overwhelming evidence to the contrary.”
Further, in
instances where mandatory review is not guaranteed, the Commission may
decline review where there is no clearly erroneous factual finding or legal
187
conclusion.
Thus, like Freytag, if there are some instances where ALJs’
decisions are final, that may make them inferior officers in all aspects of
their job.
In fact, the Landry concurrence noted that magistrate judges perform
similar functions to ALJs and that “[w]hen there is an objection to a
magistrate’s findings and recommendations, the district judge—like the
FDIC—must conduct de novo review,” but “[n]onetheless, it has long been
188
settled that federal magistrates are ‘inferior Officers.’”
Thus, although
ALJs’ decisions are reviewed de novo, they still may qualify as inferior officer,
as do magistrates.
With that said, there is a distinction between the deference given to STJ
decisions and those ALJ decisions that are subject to review. “[F]actfindings
189
contained in [an STJ’s] report shall be presumed to be correct,” whereas if
SEC Commissioners do not agree on a disposition, “the initial decision shall
190
be of no effect.”
Lucia emphasized this in reaching its ultimate
conclusion, and the degree to which this matters may influence the outcome
of the Court’s analysis.
Lastly, four of the eight current Supreme Court justices have suggested
191
that ALJs are inferior officers.
This is a close issue and it is not entirely
predictable which way the Court might rule. Under Freytag and Edmond,

185
186

187
188
189
190
191

credibility, the decision of the ALJ will be given special weight”); Barnett, supra note 119,
at 811–12 (noting that in some agencies, ALJ findings “are generally final”).
In re Fuller, Sec. Exchange Act Release No. 48406, 2003 WL 22016309, at *7 (Aug. 25,
2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In re Clawson, Sec. Exchange Act Release No. 48143, 2003 WL 21539920, at *2 (July 9,
2003) (“We accept [an ALJ’s] credibility finding, absent overwhelming evidence to the
contrary”); see also In re Pelosi, Sec. Act Release No. 3805, 2014 W.L. 1247415, at *2 (Mar.
27, 2014) (“The Commission gives considerable weight to the credibility determination of
a law judge since it is based on hearing the witnesses’ testimony and observing their
demeanor.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
17 C.F.R. § 201.411(b)(iii)(2) (1995).
Landry, 204 F.3d at 1143 (Randolph, J., concurring) (citing Rice v. Ames, 180 U.S. 371,
378 (1901)); see also Barnett, supra note 119, at 813 (discussing Landry).
Ballard v. Comm’r, 544 U.S. 40, 45 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).
17 C.F.R. § 201.411(f) (1995).
See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 542 (2010)
(Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by Ginsburg & Sotomayor, JJ.) (“As Justice Scalia has
observed, administrative law judges (ALJs) ‘are all executive officers.’”) (quoting Freytag
v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 910 (1991)) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment, joined by Kennedy, J.).
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ALJs seemingly fit the description of inferior officers. The implications
would be very unsettling to the administrative state, however. Consequently,
the Supreme Court may seek to avoid this result.

C. ALJs’ Double For-Cause Removal Does Not Infringe on Executive Power by
Insulating ALJs from Removal
Litigants have invoked Free Enterprise to argue that ALJs are also too far
192
removed from the President’s control, but unlike in Free Enterprise, the
removal power argument here is unlikely to succeed. The Constitution
states that the President must “take Care that the Laws be faithfully
193
executed.” To accomplish this, the President must be able to hold officers
accountable and “have the possibility of directing discretionary legal duties,
194
even those assigned to other officers.”
ALJs are only removable by the agency that appoints them “for good
cause established and determined by the Merit Systems Protection Board on
195
the record after opportunity for hearing.”
Both SEC Commissioners and
MSPB members are removable for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or
196
malfeasance in office.” However, because ALJs are impartial adjudicators,
their double layer of protection is likely constitutional.

1. History of the Removal Power
Although the Constitution is silent with respect to the removal of
officers, Myers v. United States held that “as [the President’s] selection of
administrative officers is essential to the execution of the laws by him, so
must be his power of removing those for whom he can not continue to be
197
responsible.” The Court later narrowed Myers’ scope, permitting Congress
to condition the President’s removal of an Officer only “for inefficiency,
198
neglect of duty or malfeasance.”
The Court ruled that because the FTC
exercised quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative power, it was not part of the
199
executive branch.
As such, the agency’s commissioners may act

192

193
194
195
196
197
198
199

Interestingly, this argument represents a complete reversal from the Due Process
argument, see infra Part IV, and alleges that ALJs are too far removed from executive
control, as opposed to too beholden to their superiors.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
See Neomi Rao, Removal: Necessary and Sufficient for Presidential Control, 65 ALA. L. REV.
1205, 1225 (2014).
5 U.S.C. § 7521(a)–(b) (1995).
Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 486–87 (citation omitted); 5 U.S.C. § 1202(d) (1995).
272 U.S. 52, 117 (1926).
Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 620 (1935).
Id. at 628. See also Rao, supra note 194, at 1230.
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200

“independently of executive control.” In Morrison v. Olson, the Court held
that an independent counsel was an inferior officer but ruled that Congress
201
still could condition removal on for-cause reasons.
202
203
Looking at these decisions together, a principal or inferior officer
may be given for-cause protection from the President’s removal power,
depending on their functions.

2. Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB
In Free Enterprise, the Court addressed whether the PCAOB could be
204
shielded by two layers of for-cause removal.
It held that Sarbanes-Oxley
imposed a “new type of restriction” on the President: “two levels of
protection from removal for those who nonetheless exercise significant
executive power. Congress cannot limit the President’s authority in this
205
way.”
However, Free Enterprise’s holding is unlikely to apply to ALJs. Unlike
PCAOB members, “Executive branch adjudicators are not generally thought
to have discretion in th[e] [policymaking or enforcement] sense, but rather
206
like other judges to be applying the law to particular facts.”
The Court
207
suggested as much, noting that the facts in Free Enterprise were unique.
Additionally, the Court is likely to seek to limit Free Enterprise’s holding.
Even in its decision, the Court distinguished ALJs and the PCAOB, noting
that ALJs exercise adjudicative rather than enforcement or policymaking
power; thus their double for-cause removal likely does not infringe
208
unconstitutionally on the President’s removal power.
200

201

202
203
204

205
206
207
208

Humphrey’s Executor, 295 U.S. at 629. Some question whether Humphrey’s Executor’s
reasoning is still applicable, since a majority of the Supreme Court has shifted from a
formalist approach to a functionalist one, recognizing that “every federal entity must be
accountable to one of the three branches.” Rao, supra note 194, at 1230–31.
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 689 (1988) (“[T]he President’s power to remove an
official cannot be made to turn on whether or not that official is classified as ‘purely
executive.’”).
See Humphrey’s Executor, 295 U.S. at 629.
See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 689–91.
The Board was removable “‘for good cause shown,’ ‘in accordance with’ certain
procedures.” Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 486
(2010) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 7211(e)(6) (2002)).
Id. at 514.
Rao, supra note 194, at 1248.
See Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 503 (“Congress enacted an unusually high standard that
must be met before Board members may be removed.”).
Id. at 507 n.10; see also Nelson, supra note 3, at 412 (“The majority itself thus recognized
that the adjudicatory function makes the ALJs different from PCAOB members and
properly beyond the reach of presidential removal power.”). But see Freytag v. Comm’r,
501 U.S. 868, 909 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(arguing that executive branch adjudicators exercise executive power).
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Another reason to doubt that Free Enterprise’s holding will be extended to
209
Indeed, some question
ALJs is that the implications could be enormous.
the strength of the distinctions the Court drew between the PCAOB and
210
ALJs and suggest it was done to avoid such far-reaching implications. It is
211
not entirely clear that ALJs perform only an adjudicatory role. The Court
took a formalist approach toward the removal power, “begin[ning] with the
premise that the structure of our constitutional democracy requires that the
President oversee the work of his subordinates and ensure they are faithfully
212
executing the laws,” regardless of the functions of those subordinates.
The dissent instead took a functionalist approach, recognizing the need for
bureaucratic independence and stressing that the “second layer of removal
protection ‘does not significantly interfere with the President’s executive
213
Power,’ and ‘violates no separation-of-powers principle.’” The dissent also
recognized that the SEC’s “various means of control” over the PCAOB, even
without removal power, were sufficient to place the PCAOB under
214
presidential control.
Some academics believe Free Enterprise’s holding
could have a huge impact on agencies, depending on the Court’s willingness
215
to extend it.
Moreover, it would be unsound to extend Free Enterprise to ALJs, since
216
adjudicators need the independence that for-cause removal provides.
It
209
210
211

212
213
214
215

216

See Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 536 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (questioning whether ALJs who
perform important administrative duties are implicated by the majority’s rule).
See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 119, at 815 (“The majority’s proposed distinctions are
unsound as stated . . . .”).
Cf. John L. Gedid, ALJ Ethics: Conundrums, Dilemmas, and Paradoxes, 11 WIDENER J. PUB. L.
33, 38 n.23 (2002) (noting that “in [NLRB’s] first fifty years of existence[,] the agency did
not promulgate a single rule. Instead, it chose to make all decisions through
adjudication.”).
Neomi Rao, Symposium, A Modest Proposal: Abolishing Agency Independence in Free
Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2541, 2553 (2011).
Id. at 2547 (quoting Free Enter., 561 U.S. at 514 (Breyer, J., dissenting)).
Id. at 2555 (discussing instruments of control mentioned by Justice Breyer that place the
PCAOB under presidential control).
See, e.g., id. at 2544–45 (“The Chief Justice’s opinion in time may be viewed like Marbury v.
Madison . . . . [T]he Court’s proof—its emphasis on the importance of presidential
control and accountability—calls into question the constitutionality of agency
independence more generally.”); Nelson, supra note 3, at 417–18 (“[T]here is no reason
to bring ALJs’ more limited and purely adjudicatory roles closer to presidential removal.
Such a radical outcome, with a serious adverse impact on the fairness of the
administrative adjudicatory system, is not required by Free Enterprise’s treatment of PCAOB
members.”); David Zaring, Enforcement Discretion at the SEC, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1155, 1193–94
(2016) (“The problem with these cases is that they seek to undo an institution that has
been part of the furniture of administrative law since the passage of the APA. If taken
seriously, they would undo most of the work of [ALJs], not just for the SEC, but also for
other agencies as well.”).
See Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 355–56 (1958) (noting that Congress “chose to
establish a Commission to adjudicate . . . claims . . . . free from the control or coercive
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seems that “[a]t a minimum, within independent agencies, [Free Enterprise]
preserves the second layer of removal protection only for dedicated
217
adjudicators.”

III.

THE IMPACT ON THE SEC AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE IF
THE SUPREME COURT WERE TO FIND AN APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE
VIOLATION

If the Supreme Court were to rule that ALJs are inferior officers, and
that they cannot be separated from the President’s control by two layers of
for-cause removal protections, the implications could be far-reaching. With
respect to the Take Care Clause, going forward, Congress and the Court
would have to figure out how to reconcile between ensuring that ALJs are
sufficiently impartial and independent of their agencies—thereby ensuring
due process—while at the same time guaranteeing that they are sufficiently
subject to presidential removal. It is not clear how this would be
accomplished.
This section focuses on the implications of an Appointments Clause
violation, since it appears more likely than a removal power issue. This
Comment argues that the potential effect on SEC adjudications is likely to
be limited to non-final cases. With respect to the administrative state as a
whole, the impact is uncertain. It is unclear that litigants would be willing to
challenge the appointments in agencies whose ALJs preside over less
contentious hearings. Further, it is not apparent which other agencies have
appointed their ALJs improperly.

A. Impact of an Appointments Clause Violation on the SEC
If the current SEC challenges—those that have not yet been subject to a
final agency ruling—prevail and the Supreme Court were to rule that the
only constitutional defect is the Appointments Clause violation, then the
SEC would have to appoint its ALJs properly. However, this defect would
not have a substantial effect on the substance of SEC proceedings, which is
why it is curious that the SEC has not cured it. Several district court judges
have even commented that the SEC has a simple remedy: have the

217

influence, direct or indirect, of either the Executive or the Congress. . . . [A] fortiori must
it be inferred that Congress did not wish to . . . [allow] removal by the President for no
reason other than that he preferred to have on that Commission men of his own
choosing.”) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); see also 5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(2)
(2012) (requiring that a hearing officer not be “responsible to or subject to the
supervision or direction of an employee or agent engaged in the performance of
investigative or prosecuting functions”).
Kevin M. Stack, Agency Independence After PCAOB, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2391, 2419 (2011).
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218

Yet the SEC has resisted this “easy
Commission appoint all of its ALJs.
219
fix,” presumably because having the Commissioners reappoint the ALJs
220
may expose past decisions to scrutiny.
Assuming the SEC was required to appoint its ALJs directly, the litigants
then would have to endure the very proceedings they have been
challenging, with little effect on the (likely adverse) outcome. Thus, the
strongest legal challenge—the Appointments Clause claim—is unlikely to
have a large practical impact. By contrast, the Due Process and Equal
Protection claims, discussed below in Part IV, are weaker legal claims, but
have led to reforms to the in-house proceedings, initiated by both the SEC
and Congress. These claims are more likely to lessen the incongruity
between the proceedings brought in-house and those brought in federal
court.
Even if there is an Appointments Clause violation, the effect on prior
SEC rulings would be cabined. Although a defect would invalidate a
221
resulting order, it would probably only impact cases that have raised direct
222
challenges, namely those not yet subject to a final decision.
Since a final
Commission order must be appealed within sixty days, the number of

218

219

220

221

222

See Hill v. SEC, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1320 (N.D. Ga. 2015) (“Hill I”) (“[T]he ALJ’s
appointment could easily be cured by having the SEC Commissioners issue an
appointment.”).
See Letter at 1, Duka v. SEC, 103 F. Supp. 3d 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (No. 15-cv-357), ECF No.
41 (noting that the judge in Hill “appears to have been opining on the ease of remedying
the likely constitutional defect in the SEC ALJ’s appointment . . . . [The
judge] apparently believes that the Commissioners could, with little difficulty and
consistent with the Appointments Clause, appoint the ALJ as if he were an inferior
officer”). However, the SEC did not address whether it was an easy fix or whether it
would consider appointing the ALJs in this manner. Instead, the SEC has chosen to
respond to the Due Process challenges and proposed new rules, which may have a greater
impact on future SEC proceedings. See infra Part IV.B.
Alison Frankel, Why the SEC Can’t Easily Solve Appointments Clause Problem with ALJs,
REUTERS (June 17, 2015), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2015/06/17/why-thesec-cant-easily-solve-appointments-clause-problem-with-aljs
(pointing
out
that
reappointment of ALJs could be taken as an admission that prior appointments were not
constitutionally sound).
See Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1132 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“A defect in the appointment
of an ‘examiner’ (precursor of today’s ALJ) was, if properly raised, ‘an irregularity which
would invalidate a resulting order.’”) (quoting United States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines,
Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 38 (1952)).
See United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 543 (1982) (citing favorably to the common
law rule that “in both civil and criminal litigation, . . . a change in law will be given effect
[only] while a case is on direct review”) (quoting Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618
(1965) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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223

implicated cases is limited. However, any litigant still before the SEC or a
224
court of appeals may properly raise this challenge.
225
The de facto officer doctrine jurisprudence should preclude litigants
from raising the Appointments Clause challenge on collateral appeal. The
de facto officer doctrine is “an ancient but cloudy body of law designed to
226
protect the acts of officials whose title to office has been challenged.”
It
was developed in Buckley v. Valeo, where the Court held that even though the
Federal Election Committee’s composition was invalid, that “should not
affect the validity of the Commission’s administrative actions and
227
determinations to this date . . . .”
Thus, the doctrine “guards against the
‘chaos’ that would otherwise result by protecting the validity of acts
performed by a public officer whose appointment has been deemed
228
229
invalid.” However, its impact was narrowed in Ryder v. United States.
In all likelihood, only litigants who raised the issue on direct appeal will
be able to take advantage of a decision invalidating ALJs’ appointments.
Collateral attack is unavailable, since the ALJ position is itself legally created
230
by Congress, and all that must be cured is the appointment.
The SEC will likely be unable to invoke the de facto officer doctrine to
shield itself from direct challenges, however. The de facto officer doctrine
“provided a defense when a party challenged government action based not
on the invalidity of the law applied, but based on the invalidity of the public
231
officer carrying out the action.”
In Ryder, the Supreme Court declined to
apply that doctrine because the challenge was raised directly during the
232
agency appeal. The Court recognized the need to carve out an exception
to the doctrine when one “makes a timely challenge to the constitutional
validity of the appointment of an officer who adjudicates his case,” since to

223
224

225
226
227
228
229
230

231
232

15 U.S.C. § 78y(a)(1) (2012).
Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 177 (1995) (holding that because the Appointments
Clause challenge was properly raised on direct appeal, the Court of Military Appeals
erred in affirming the decision through the de facto officer doctrine).
See Deepak Gupta, The Consumer Protection Bureau and the Constitution, 65 ADMIN. L. REV.
945, 964–72 (2013) (explaining the de facto officer doctrine).
Id. at 947.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 142 (1976) (per curiam).
Gupta, supra note 225, at 960.
Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177 (1995). See Gupta, supra note 225, at 965 (observing
that Ryder appears to narrow the de facto officer doctrine).
See Ryder, 515 U.S. at 182 (“[T]he title of a person acting with color of authority, even if
he be not a good officer in point of law, cannot be collaterally attacked.”); Ex parte Ward,
173 U.S. 452, 454 (1899) (“[W]here a court has jurisdiction of an offense and of the
accused, and the proceedings are otherwise regular, a conviction is lawful, although the
judge holding the court may be only an officer de facto, and . . . the validity of the title of
such judge . . . cannot be determined [collaterally].”).
Gupta, supra note 225, at 966.
Ryder, 515 U.S. at 187–88.
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hold otherwise “would create a disincentive to raise Appointments Clause
233
challenges with respect to questionable judicial appointments.” That logic
seems to apply to the present cases and might prevent the SEC from
invoking the doctrine to avoid having to retry cases raising Appointments
Clause challenges that have not reached final judgment.
However, it is possible that there could be a different result here and
that the Court would not require any re-hearings. In Ryder, the issue was
234
that the Court of Military Appeals recently had ruled that the Court of
235
Military Review judges were inferior officers, but held that that ruling
236
should be applied only prospectively.
The Supreme Court disagreed and
opted not to invoke the remedial discretion doctrine, noting that “there is
not the sort of grave disruption or inequity involved in awarding
retrospective relief to this petitioner that would bring [the remedial
discretion] doctrine into play,” since there were only seven to ten cases
237
pending on direct review.
Here, there are likely more cases implicated,
possibly leading the Court not to permit even current litigants to use the
improper appointments to obtain new hearings. Additionally, the Court in
238
Ryder noted that the higher military court had a limited scope of review.
However, here the SEC reviews ALJ decisions de novo, which might support
application of the remedial discretion doctrine, since the plaintiffs did not
239
clearly suffer harm.
Nonetheless, I argue that for direct challenges, the
Court will require new hearings for those cases that raised the challenge on
240
direct appeal, as it did in Ryder.
To hold otherwise would be to
disincentivize Appointments Clause challenges, which was the exact concern
that motivated the outcome in Ryder.

233
234
235
236
237
238
239

240

Id. at 182–83.
See id. at 187 (noting that the Court of Military Appeals is “[t]he court of last resort in the
military justice system”).
U.S. v. Carpenter, 37 M.J. 291, 296 (1993).
Ryder, 515 U.S. at 188.
Id. at 185.
See id. at 187 (noting that because the higher court had a limited scope of review, it was
not harmless error).
See Landry v FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1140 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Randolph, J., concurring)
(finding that ALJs are inferior officers, but concurring in the decision to affirm the
agency’s dismissal because the complainant “suffered no prejudicial error”).
See Kent Barnett, To the Victor Goes the Toil—Remedies for Regulated Parties in Separation-ofPowers Litigation, 92 N.C. L. REV. 481, 529 (2014) (noting that the Court in Ryder required
a new hearing for the petitioner because of the improper appointment); see also Gupta,
supra note 225, at 969 (elaborating on the Court’s decision for the remedy that it
provided in Ryder).
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B. Recent Appointments Clause Violations
Looking at how two recent unconstitutional appointments impacted the
effected agencies provides further insight into the possible effects of an
Appointments Clause violation, although neither appears to be much help
to the SEC.

1. National Labor Relations Board
On January 4, 2012, President Obama appointed three NLRB members
as recess appointments. This action was challenged on the grounds that the
Senate was not actually in recess and that President Obama simply had
decided it was because senators were refusing to confirm his
241
appointments.
In NLRB v. Noel Canning, the Court held that the
242
appointments were unconstitutional.
Thus, the NLRB lacked the
statutorily mandated quorum from January 4, 2012 until July 30, 2013, when
the Senate confirmed the appointments. Consequently, the NLRB “issued
roughly 700 reported and unreported decisions while sitting on quorum-less
243
boards. Each of those decisions is arguably invalid.” Some contended that
the de facto officer doctrine could be used to avoid relitigating the 100 cases
244
still pending in appeals courts.
On remand, rather than relitigate the case, the NLRB stated that it
considered the case de novo and agreed with the rationale set forth in the
now-vacated Decision and Order. Accordingly, it affirmed the judge’s
rulings, findings, and conclusions and adopted the judge’s recommended
245
246
Order. The D.C. Circuit affirmed. The NLRB also ratified every agency
247
action taken. The NLRB likely will rubberstamp every decision, as it did in

241
242
243
244

245
246
247

Matthew C. Stephenson, Can the President Appoint Principal Executive Officers Without a Senate
Confirmation Vote?, 22 YALE L.J. 940, 943 (2013).
NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2578 (2014).
Bryan J. Leitch, NLRB v. Noel Canning: The Separation-of-Powers Dialogue Continues, 2014
CATO SUP. CT. REV. 221, 252–53 (2014).
See, e.g., Ryan J. Levan, Do We Have A Quorum?: Anticipating Agency Vacancies and the Prospect
for Judicial Remedy, 48 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 181, 205–06 (2015) (illustrating Justice
Scalia’s remarks that the government could sufficiently depend on the de facto officer
doctrine to validate decisions made by NLRB appointees).
Noel Canning v. NLRB, 361 NLRB No. 129, 2014 WL 7189095, at *1 (Dec. 16, 2014).
Noel Canning v. NLRB, 823 F.3d 76, 81 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
Press Release, NLRB Office of Pub. Affairs, NLRB Officials Ratify Agency Actions Taken
During Period when Supreme Court Held Board Members Were Not Validly Appointed
(Aug. 4, 2014), https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-story/nlrb-officials-ratifyagency-actions-taken-during-period-when-supreme-court (declaring that “[t]he National
Labor Relations Board unanimously ratified all administrative, personnel, and
proceurement matters taken by the Board”).
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2010 when the Court also invalidated hundreds of its decisions for lack of a
248
quorum.
It is uncertain whether the SEC would be able to replicate the NLRB’s
tactic of rubber-stamping old rulings. Unlike the NLRB, it was a hearing
officer, not a reviewing one, whose appointment was defective. As such, the
SEC may have to hold a new hearing for any litigant whose case had not
reached final judgment. However, it is also possible that the newly and
properly appointed ALJs could review the record amassed by the defectively
appointed ALJs and rubber-stamp the outcomes.
The SEC also may try and distinguish Noel Canning, since the
Commission reviewed the hearing officer’s actions de novo and therefore
any error was harmless. This Comment does not believe the SEC would be
249
successful.

2. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
Similar to the NLRB, the CFPB Director, Richard Cordray, was
appointed improperly as a result of Senate Republicans’ refusal to confirm
anyone for the position due to political opposition to the Board’s
250
251
existence.
Cordray was not appointed until July 16, 2013. Noel Canning
would have been applicable to the CFPB. However, like the NLRB, Cordray,
252
once confirmed, moved to ratify every action he took during that period.
Cordray’s actions similarly are not replicable by the SEC, since the
circumstances are distinguishable. The CFPB’s authorizing statute stated:
“The [Treasury] Secretary is authorized to perform the functions of the
Bureau under this part until the Director of the Bureau is confirmed by the
253
Senate in accordance with [12 U.S.C. § 5491].”
Accordingly, because
“Dodd-Frank empowers the Acting Secretary of the Treasury to ratify certain
actions of the Bureau when no director is in place[, t]his recourse along

248

249
250

251
252

253

See, e.g., J.S. Carambola, LLC, 355 N.L.R.B. 367, 367 (2010) (“The Board has reviewed the
record in light of the exceptions and brief, and has adopted the hearing officer’s findings
and recommendations to the extent and for the reasons stated in the May 28, 2008
Decision.”).
See supra note 240 and accompanying text.
Danielle Douglas, Senate Confirms Cordray to Head Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,
WASH. POST (July 16, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/
senate-confirms-consumer-watchdog-nominee-richard-cordray/2013/07/16/965d82c2ee2b-11e2-a1f9-ea873b7e0424_story.html.
Id.
See Notice of Ratification, 78 Fed. Reg. 53734 (Aug. 30, 2013) (“I believe that the actions I
took during the period I was serving as a recess appointee were legally authorized and
entirely proper. To avoid any possible uncertainty, however, I hereby affirm and ratify
any and all actions I took during that period.”).
12 U.S.C. § 5586(a) (2010).
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with the ‘de facto officer’ doctrine provides a sense of security for existing
254
Bureau promulgations.”
Although it is outside the scope of this Comment, it is also worth noting
that the CFPB’s Director position has been challenged and was found to
255
violate Article II.

C. Possible Repercussions for ALJs in Other Agencies
256

Since many other agencies also rely heavily on ALJs, the implications of
an Appointments Clause defect could extend beyond the SEC and send
ripples through the administrative state. Its potential scope depends on
both the nature of the functions and the extent of authority wielded by ALJs
257
in other agencies, as well as the manner in which they were appointed. As
an initial matter, any ALJ in a non-department agency is, arguably,
258
unconstitutionally appointed.
At least one agency was not willing to take
259
any chances and preemptively had its department heads appoint its ALJs.
At least one agency appears to properly appoint its ALJs and therefore is not
260
implicated by this issue.
The agency that would be most impacted by an adverse Appointments
Clause ruling is the Social Security Administration (“SSA”). The SSA
261
employs 1400 ALJs, who have a caseload of 832,000.
Like SEC ALJs, SSA
262
ALJs conduct hearings, manage factual information,
judge witness

254

255
256

257

258

259

260

261
262

S. Austin King, Mounting a Judicial Challenge to President Barack Obama’s Recess Appointment
of Richard Cordray: The Constitutional Mandate of Standing, 17 N.C. BANKING INST. 305, 330
(2013).
PHH Corp. v. CFPB, 839 F.3d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
For a list of agencies that utilize ALJs, see Agencies Employing Administrative Law Judges,
Ass’n of Admin. Law Judges, http://www.aalj.org/agencies-employing-administrative-lawjudges (last visited Dec. 29, 2016).
See Free Enter. Fund. V. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 556–92 apps. B
& C (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that there are approximately 1284 ALJs, whose
dual layer of for-cause removal could be constitutionally suspect, particularly if they have
been defectively appointed).
Barnett, supra note 119, at 810 n.77 (“For each ALJ appointment, one must know which
entity is appointing and whether that entity is a department.”). For a list of agencies that
“may not qualify as departments,” see id.
Alison Frankel, Unlike SEC, FTC Makes Quick Fix to Ward off ALJ Constitutional Challenges,
REUTERS (Sept. 16, 2015), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2015/09/16/unlikesec-ftc-makes-quick-fix-to-ward-off-alj-constitutional-challenges.
See Press Release, NLRB Office of Pub. Affairs, NLRB Appoints Four New Administrative
Law Judges (Nov. 4 2013), https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-story/nlrbappoints-four-new-administrative-law-judges (“The National Labor Relations Board today
announced the appointments of [various individuals] as [ALJs] . . . .”).
Lubbers, supra note 16, at 5. The SSA employs approximately 85% of all ALJs. Id.
20 C.F.R. § 404.944 (1995).
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264

They also issue
credibility, issue subpoenas, and question witnesses.
written decisions and “give the findings of fact and the reasons for the
265
decision.”
Indeed, there is a much stronger argument that SSA ALJs
266
should be considered inferior officers, since not every SSA ALJ decision is
reviewed by the Appeals Council, and it becomes binding if the Council
267
declines to hear it. Thus, a party is not guaranteed review of an SSA ALJ’s
decision.
It is unclear how the SSA appoints all its ALJs. Unlike the SEC, its
regulations state that the Commissioner appoints ALJs in disability hearings,
268
which would quash an Appointments Clause issue. However, in a separate
benefits section, an SSA regulation states that the “Deputy Commissioner for
Disability Adjudication and Review, or his or her delegate,” appoints ALJs,
269
which would expose the SSA to an Appointments Clause challenge.
That
said, there may be practical reasons why these proceedings would not be
challenged. Since a subject of an SSA hearing is seeking government
benefits as opposed to defending against an enforcement action, he or she
270
has less reason to challenge the ALJ’s constitutionality.
Nonetheless, it is
possible that § 404.929 could be challenged.
Whether ALJs are inferior officers implicates other agencies as well.
Several agencies’ ALJs, like the SSA’s, may issue final decisions in certain
271
instances and thus likely would be inferior officers.
As such, the
constitutionality of these ALJs is contingent on the nature of their
appointments. Several of these agencies’ ALJs are not appointed by

263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270

271

See Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (describing the analysis that
ALJs must undertake when assessing the credibility of witnesses’ testimony).
20 C.F.R. § 404.950(d)–(e) (1995).
Id. § 404.943(c)(1).
See Stack, supra note 217, at 2408 n.101 (noting that SSA ALJs are inferior officers, “even
under Landry’s restrictive reading of Freytag”).
20 C.F.R. § 404.955 (1995).
See id. § 405.301(b) (“The Commissioner will appoint an administrative law judge to
conduct the hearing.”).
Id. § 404.929.
Indeed, the government is not even represented at SSA benefit proceedings. Richard J.
Pierce, Jr., What Should We Do About Social Security Disability Appeals?, REGULATION, at 36
(Fall
2011),
https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2011/9/regv34n33.pdf.
Timony, supra note 39, at 811 n.25 (listing agencies that allow ALJs to issue final agency
determinations: Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n, Fed. Mine Safety and
Health Review Comm’n, Civil Aeronautics Bd., and the Int’l Trade Comm’n). Other
agencies whose ALJs may issue final determinations include: Small Bus. Admin., 13 C.F.R.
§ 134.409 (2016); NLRB, 29 C.F.R. § 101.12(b) (2015); U.S. Postal Serv., 39 C.F.R. §
966.11 (2015); and CFTC, 17 C.F.R. § 10.84(c) (2016).
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272

While this Comment is not aware of any such
Department Heads.
challenges, any agency whose ALJs are inferior officers could find itself in
the same predicament as the SEC.

IV.
EVEN IF ALJS ARE NOT INFERIOR OFFICERS, THE CURRENT
LITIGATION HAS ALTERED SEC PRACTICES GOING FORWARD
The Due Process and Equal Protection challenges to the SEC’s use of
ALJs are unlikely to succeed. However, the publicity garnered by these
complaints has pressured the SEC to funnel more enforcement actions to
federal court and led it to propose new rules to modernize its in-house
hearings. It has also driven Congress to propose the Due Process
Restoration Act.

A. Merits of Due Process and Equal Protection Claims Against the SEC
This subsection briefly describes the Due Process and Equal Protection
273
challenges, since they already have been thoroughly analyzed.
None of
them are likely to succeed.

1. Due Process
Because of the disparate amount of process afforded to litigants in
federal court versus in SEC hearings, there have been significant complaints
274
that litigants are entitled to more process than the SEC provides.
However, such claims are unlikely to succeed, given that the SEC’s Rules of
Practice “are, in most respects, similar to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure . . . . [and] are virtually identical to U.S. district court bench
275
trials.”

272

273
274

275

See, e.g., Small Bus. Admin., 13 C.F.R. § 134.218(a) (2016) (“The [Assistant Administrator
for OHA] will assign all cases . . . to an [ALJ].”); Dep’t of Labor, 29 C.F.R. § 2200.1(f)
(2015) (“Judge means an [ALJ] appointed by the Chairman of the Commission.”); U.S.
Postal Serv., 39 C.F.R. § 953.10 (2015) (“The presiding officer at any hearing shall be
an [ALJ] qualified in accordance with law (5 U.S.C. [§] 3105) and assigned by the
Judicial Officer.”).
For an in-depth analysis of these challenges, see Zaring, supra note 215.
See, e.g., Chau v. SEC, 72 F. Supp. 3d 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (alleging that “the SEC’s choice
to pursue them administratively, as opposed to suing them in a United States District
Court, [had] deprive[d] them of their rights to due process”).
Daniel F. Solomon, Summary of Administrative Law Judge Responsibilities, 31 J. NAT’L ASSOC.
ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 475, 516 (2011); see also Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1973)
(“[F]ederal administrative law requires that agency adjudication contain many of the
same safeguards as are available in the judicial process . . . . [and] the role of the
modern . . . [ALJ] is functionally comparable to that of a judge.”) (internal quotation
marks omitted); Zaring, supra note 215, at 1197 (“The Supreme Court has praised the

Dec. 2016]

THE SEC’S POTENTIAL APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE DEFECT

559

Depending on a case’s complexity—which the SEC determines—an
initial decision must be rendered within 120, 210, or 300 days, with at most
276
Additionally, the SEC’s rules
four months to prepare for the hearing.
277
limit discovery and allow pre-trial depositions only when a witness will be
278
unable to testify at a hearing.
Moreover, it often can take over a year
279
before a case makes its way into federal court, at which point the court will
280
defer on disputed facts, making reversal difficult to attain. Although there
is a looser evidentiary standard in SEC hearings, which permits the SEC to
use hearsay evidence that otherwise would be excluded under the Federal
281
Rules of Evidence, hearsay is admissible because “[t]he rules of evidence
282
are relaxed in an administrative proceeding.”
The SEC also defers to its
ALJs’ findings and accepts “credibility finding[s], absent overwhelming
283
evidence to the contrary.”
Lastly, some argue that there is an inherent

276

277

278
279
280

281

282

283

process offered by ALJs in the past, and agencies have been expressly permitted to
combine the functions of enforcement and adjudication under one roof.”).
17 C.F.R. § 201.360(a)(2) (1995); see also Ryan, supra note 19 (noting that there is not
enough time to prepare for a hearing given that the SEC often spends years building
cases). By contrast, Article III judges “follow no statutorily imposed deadline.” Ryan
Jones, Comment, The Fight over Home Court: An Analysis of the SEC’s Increased Use of
Administrative Proceedings, 68 SMU L. REV. 507, 524 (2015).
See Atkins & Bondi, supra note 30, at 411–12 (noting that the SEC is criticized for “failing
to share critical incriminating—and most importantly, exculpatory—evidence that
the SEC has gathered”). Judge Jed Rakoff, a noted critic of the SEC’s use of ALJs, stated
that the proceedings provide “much more limited discovery than federal actions, with no
provision whatsoever for either depositions or interrogatories.” Jed S. Rakoff, PLI
Securities Regulation Institute Keynote Address 7 (Nov. 5, 2014). Judge Rakoff also has
criticized the SEC for exerting undue pressure to force settlements and using consent
judgments and has wondered, “from where does the constitutional warrant for such
unchecked and unbalanced administrative power derive?” SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts.,
Inc., 34 F. Supp. 3d 379, 380 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
17 C.F.R. § 201.233(b) (1995).
Ryan, supra note 19.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78y(4) (2012) (“The findings of the Commission as to the facts, if
supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive.”); see also Penasquitos Vill., Inc. v.
NLRB, 565 F.2d 1074, 1078 (9th Cir. 1977) (“[A] reviewing court will review more
critically the Board’s findings of fact if they are contrary to the administrative law judge’s
factual conclusions.”).
See, e.g., Gonnella, Exchange Act Release No. 1579, at *2 (July 2, 2014) (“There is no per se
bar to the admission of hearsay evidence in the Commission’s administrative proceedings.
. . . [H]earsay evidence that is relevant is admissible in administrative proceedings.”).
Oversight of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement: Hearing on H.R. 114-9 Before the Subcomm. on
Capital Mkts. & Gov’t Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 114th Cong. 26 (2015)
(presenting the statement of Andrew J. Ceresney, Director, SEC Division of
Enforcement). The Supreme Court also has noted that “differences in the origin and
function of administrative agencies preclude wholesale transplantation of the rules of
procedure, trial, and review which have evolved from the history and experience of
courts.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Ironridge Global IV, Ltd. v. SEC, 146 F. Supp. 3d 1294, 1298 (2015).
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peculiarity in having the SEC Commissioners—the very people who
authorize the Enforcement Division to initiate an action—review whether
284
the Enforcement Division has failed to prove its case.
285
However, some argue that these concerns are overblown.
Litigants in
SEC proceedings are given more process than is constitutionally required in
286
an agency hearing.
As such, this argument is unlikely to advance far in
federal court.
Another challenge leveled against the SEC is the lack of a jury, which
287
otherwise would be available in federal court.
This argument is similarly
unconvincing, since Congress is permitted to assign cases to administrative
288
proceedings that otherwise would be brought in federal court.
289
Academics also question whether ALJs are sufficiently impartial. Even
though ALJs are removable only for-cause, their “effective life
tenure . . . loses some of its sheen because of the ambiguity of the good
290
cause standard . . . .” Indeed, in a recent SEC hearing in which the ALJ’s
independence was questioned, the SEC invited the ALJ to submit an affidavit
stating whether he felt undue pressure from the SEC to rule in its favor
284

285

286
287

288
289

290

Walfish, supra note 19; cf. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 41 (1950)
(explaining that one of the purposes of the APA was “to curtail and change the practice
of embodying in one person or agency the duties of prosecutor and judge”), overruled on
other grounds by Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129, 133 (1995).
See Oversight of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement, supra note 282, at 26 (providing Ceresney’s
statement that there is “more extensive discovery. . . . [for] documents and items that are
in [its] file” because the SEC “turn[s] over [its] whole file, typically within 7 days” as
required by SEC rules); see also Zaring, supra note 215, at 1198 (noting that “ALJs have
been held up as examples of due process” by the Supreme Court); id. (citing Fed. Mar.
Comm’n v. South Carolina State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 759 (2002)) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (“[T]he similarities between adjudication before ALJs and
before federal district court judges are overwhelming.”).
See Zaring, supra note 215, at 1197–99 (arguing that parties appearing before SEC ALJs
are not constitutionally entitled to more process than they receive).
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 50, at 17; see also U.S. CONST.
amend. VII (“In Suits at common law . . . the right of trial by jury shall be preserved . . .
.”).
Zaring, supra note 215, at 1205.
See Barnett, supra note 119, at 827 (questioning whether “the current administrative
system is in excellent health,” but noting that “[d]espite concerns over ALJ
impartiality . . . the Supreme Court may not find a due process violation, given its
wariness of upsetting long-standing administrative practices”); Harold H. Bruff, Specialized
Courts in Administrative Law, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 329, 352 (1991) (“[T]hose who work
within an agency are subject to a multitude of open or subtle socializing pressures.”); L.
Harold Levinson, The Status of the Administrative Judge, 38 AM. J. COMP. L. 523, 537 (1990)
(“Large numbers of hearing officers . . . are non-tenured. They must, nevertheless,
render independent and impartial decisions.”). But see Harold J. Krent & Lindsay DuVall,
Accommodating ALJ Decision Making Independence with Institutional Interests of the
Administrative Judiciary, 25 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 1, 4 n.11 (2005) (“[T]he APA
protections insulate ALJs far more than due process dictates.”).
Barnett, supra note 119, at 807.
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and—in a move that certainly raised more than a few eyebrows—the ALJ
291
As of May 6, 2015, that same ALJ—who has worked for the SEC
refused.
292
since 2011—had never ruled against the SEC. Additionally, a former SEC
ALJ, Lillian McEwen, stated that she felt the procedures unfairly favored the
SEC, that the Chief ALJ had “questioned [her] loyalty,” and that she was
“expected to work under an assumption that the burden was on the people
who were accused to show that they didn’t do what the agency said they
293
did.”
The SEC’s Office of Inspector General investigated these
294
295
allegations and cleared the SEC of any improper bias toward its ALJs.
Possibly undermining the claim that ALJs are insufficiently independent,
one ALJ recently granted a subpoena request for “[a]ll documents and
communications that support, or reflect or are related to the allegations
296
made by Lillian McEwen,” thereby permitting an inquiry into the merits of
the impartiality accusations.
Others have criticized the disparity between the SEC’s success in federal
297
court and in administrative proceedings,
which the SEC has
298
acknowledged. However, Supreme Court precedent suggests that ALJs are
299
not too partial.
Accordingly, this argument is unlikely to succeed absent
proof that improper pressure is exerted on ALJs.

291
292
293
294

295

296
297
298

299

Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 9–10, Timbervest, LLC v. SEC, No.
1:15-cv-02106-LMM, 2015 WL 7597428 (N.D. Ga. June 12, 2015).
Eaglesham, supra note 19.
Id.
Interim Report of Investigation, SEC Office of Inspector General (Aug. 7, 2015),
https://www.sec.gov/oig/reportspubs/oig-sec-interim-report-investigation-admin-lawjudges.pdf.
Suzanne Barlyn, Watchdog Clears U.S. SEC’s In-House Judges of Bias Allegations, REUTERS
(Feb. 16, 2016, 4:57 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-sec-court-biasidUSKCN0VP2OL.
Hill, Exchange Act Release No. 2706, at *2 (May 21, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/
alj/aljorders/2015/ap-2706.pdf.
Rakoff, supra note 277, at 7.
See Oversight of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement, supra note 282, at 26–27 (statement of
Ceresney) (confirming that in the prior year, the SEC won 100 percent of its cases in
agency hearings, but won only 11 of 18 cases in federal court). This disparity did not go
unnoticed by Congress. See id. at 27 (Congressman Duffy testifying, “Do you think there
could be any correlation when you actually hire the judges and you set the rules that you
win all the cases? . . . . And you might say . . . . I want to bring more cases in front of the
judges that I hire and abide by the rules that I set as opposed to letting these cases go into
Federal court. And low and behold, wow, I win them all.”).
See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 52 (1975) (“[C]ase law, both federal and state,
generally rejects the idea that the combination of judging and investigating functions is a
denial of due process.”) (alterations omitted); Zaring, supra note 215, at 1199–1200
(noting that people have long complained that the SEC operates as prosecutor and
judge, but that claim “has never gone very far in the courts”); Barnett, supra note 119, at
820–21 (“Although certain of these decisions strongly suggest that ALJs are sufficiently

562

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 19:2

2. Equal Protection and Choice of Venue Claims
Those raising Equal Protection claims argue that the SEC unfairly
targeted them by forcing them to undergo an in-house proceeding. They
claim that the SEC acted arbitrarily with respect to where it chose to bring
actions, depriving in-house litigants of the benefits of the Federal Rules of
300
Civil Procedure and Federal Rules of Evidence.
However, Congress has
301
explicitly allowed the SEC to select its preferred forum.
Nonetheless,
claimants note the “lack of any congressional principal guiding the
302
Commission’s selection of a forum.”
In response, the SEC published
303
guidelines for how it decides which forum to select, which is entitled to
304
some degree of deference even though the factors the SEC gave are
305
vague.
Moreover, courts generally defer to an agency’s decision to bring claims
306
against individuals.
The only successful SEC Equal Protection claim this
Comment is aware of contained particularly egregious facts, wherein the
challenger was the only one out of twenty-nine co-defendants subjected to
307
an in-house hearing.
That court denied the SEC’s motion to dismiss

300
301

302
303

304

305

306

307

impartial in fact and appearance, scholars have not considered the impact of the
decisions’ limitations, especially after . . . Free Enterprise Fund.”).
See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 50, at 23–25.
H.R. REP. NO. 111-687, at 78 (2010). Dodd-Frank renders “the SEC’s authority in
administrative penalty proceedings coextensive with its authority to seek penalties in
Federal court.” Id.
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 50, at 28.
Division of Enforcement Approach to Forum Selection in Contested Actions, SEC ENF’T DIV.,
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/enforcement-approach-forum-selection-contestedactions.pdf (last visited Dec. 29, 2016) (listing the non-exhaustive factors it considers: the
availability of the desired claims, legal theories, and forms of relief in each forum; the
cost‐, resource‐, and time‐effectiveness of litigation in each forum; fair, consistent, and
effective resolution of securities law issues).
See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001) (holding “that
administrative implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies for
Chevron deference when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency
generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation
claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority,” even absent
administrative formality); see also Zaring, supra note 215, at 1190 (“[T]he agency’s policy
of initiating more administrative proceedings is a reasonable interpretation of the
amendments to Dodd-Frank authorizing it to do so . . . .”)
See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 50, at 29 (claiming that
the SEC’s guidelines “offer little clarity as to how the SEC goes about selecting the
forum”).
Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 248 (1980); cf. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S.
456, 464 (1996) (noting the discretion afforded to federal prosecutors when they are
deciding whether to bring criminal charges).
See Gupta v. SEC, 796 F. Supp. 2d 503, 506 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (asserting that “the [SEC]—
having previously filed all of its Galleon-related insider trading actions in this federal

Dec. 2016]

THE SEC’S POTENTIAL APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE DEFECT

563

because “there is already a well-developed public record of Gupta being
treated substantially disparately from 28 essentially identical defendants,
with not even a hint from the SEC, even in their instant papers, as to why
308
However, the facts in Gupta v. SEC are unique and do
this should be so.”
not seem to pave a path for other litigants to successfully raise equal
309
protection claims.
It also is unclear whether the claim ultimately would
have succeeded, since the SEC dropped the in-house charges and re-filed
310
them in federal court.
Therefore, those raising Equal Protection claims
are unlikely to prevail.

B. Current Efforts to Respond to the Due Process Concerns
1. Effects on Current SEC Litigation
Despite contrary rhetoric, the SEC seems to be altering its enforcement
strategy in response to the complaints and scaling back its use of ALJs in
contested cases. In the first and second quarters of fiscal year 2015, the SEC
brought close to 40% and 50% of its contested cases in-house, respectively,
which dropped to just over 20% in the third quarter and again to just 11%
311
in the fourth quarter.
The 11% fourth quarter number represents a
substantial decrease from the 40% brought in the previous year’s fourth
312
quarter.
According to the Wall Street Journal, sources familiar with the
SEC claim that SEC Director Andrew Ceresney told senior staff to file
contested cases alleging insider trading or accounting fraud in federal court
313
absent good reason to utilize SEC ALJs.
Indeed, since Hill, the SEC has
314
brought every suspected insider trading case in federal court.
Since May

308
309

310
311

312
313
314

district—decided it preferred its home turf” and referring to the SEC’s actions as a
“seeming exercise in forum-shopping”).
Id. at 514.
See Jarkesy v. SEC, 803 F.3d 9, 23 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (noting that Gupta’s “broad definition
misconceives how the Supreme Court and our court have understood the term ‘wholly
collateral’ in the Thunder Basin line of cases”); Chau v. SEC, 72 F. Supp. 3d 417, 431
(S.DN.Y. 2014) (noting that Gupta, even if correctly decided, was factually
distinguishable).
SEC v. Gupta, No. 11 Civ. 7566(JSR), 2012 WL 6767789 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 26, 2012).
Jean Eaglesham, SEC Trims Use of In-House Judges: Regulator Sends Fewer Cases to Its Tribunal,
A Practice That Brought It Legal Challenges, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 11, 2015, 9:00 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-trims-use-of-in-house-judges-1444611604.
Id.
Id.
Id.; see, e.g., Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Pennsylvania Attorney with Insider Trading
in Advance of Merger Announcement (July 16, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/
pressrelease/2015-149.html; Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Company Executive with
Insider Trading (Feb. 5, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-24.html;
Press Release, SEC, Childhood Friends Charged with Insider Trading in Pharmaceutical
Stocks (June 3, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-108.html; Press
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2015, the SEC’s success rate also is down, as four of the last twelve
defendants in contested cases have been cleared by ALJs, lowering the SEC’s
315
success rate to 72%.

2. Prospective SEC and Congressional Responses
Although the SEC claims it is not in response to the ongoing challenges,
it recently proposed and enacted new rules “to modernize our rules of
practice for administrative proceedings, including provisions for additional
316
time and prescribed discovery for the parties.”
These rules were recently
317
ratified and became effective September 27, 2016.
They appear to be
responses to both the negative publicity stemming from the Due Process
challenges as well as the risk of losing as a result of the Appointments Clause
challenges.
318
Some of the SEC’s rule changes are fairly defendant-friendly. The SEC
will extend the time frame for ALJs to issue decisions, increasing flexibility
for when the hearing must be held, and making it easier to obtain a
319
deadline extension.
In the most complex ten-month cases, the SEC will
permit a respondent to take three depositions, or five if there is more than
one respondent, as well as to request from the hearing officer for leave to
320
take two additional depositions.
The SEC also enacted a rule to toll the
Rule 360 time deadlines when the Commission is considering settlement
321
offers.
However, there also are several noticeably agency-friendly changes. A
respondent must affirmatively state in its answer any theory for avoiding
322
liability, not just affirmative defenses.
Respondents also must state
whether they intend to raise as a defense the reliance on professional
323
advice.
The SEC now permits an ALJ or the Commission to quash a
subpoena not only if it would be “unreasonable, oppressive, or unduly

315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322
323

Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Charges Hedge Fund Manager Leon
Cooperman with Insider Trading (Sept. 21, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/
pressrelease/2016-189.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2016).
Eaglesham, supra note 311.
Press Release, SEC, supra note 12.
See Amendments to the Commission’s Rules of Practice, 81 Fed. Reg. 50212, (July 29,
2016).
Rather than recite each of the recently proposed rules, I will briefly set forth a few of the
ones more pertinent to this Comment.
See Amendments to the Commission’s Rules of Practice, 81 Fed. Reg. at 50214 (codified at
17 C.F.R. § 201.360 (2016)).
Id. at 50216 (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 201.233 (2016)).
Id. at 50219 (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 201.161 (2016)).
Id. at 50219–20 (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 201.220 (2016)) (enabling the SEC to learn a
defendant’s theory of the case prior to the hearing).
Id. at 50220 (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 201.220 (2016)).
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burdensome” but also if it would “unduly delay” the hearing.
The SEC
also proposed making it possible to serve an order on a person in a foreign
country by any “method authorized by the Hague Convention on the Service
325
Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents.”
In addition to the SEC’s rules, Congress also has sought to change SEC
in-house proceedings. Congress proposed a bill that not only would allow
for any respondent subject to a cease and desist order to remove the case to
federal court, but also would raise the required standard of proof in SEC
proceedings from a preponderance of the evidence to clear and convincing
326
evidence.
If passed, the bill would eviscerate the choice of venue power
that Dodd-Frank conferred on the SEC.
However, regardless of what efforts the SEC and Congress undertake to
better align SEC proceedings with those in federal court, they will fall short
327
of what is available to litigants in federal court.
Further, experienced
lawyers will continue looking for ways to challenge the SEC’s enforcement
tactics and its use of ALJs in contested cases.

CONCLUSION
The future of ALJs, both within the SEC and throughout the
administrative state, is at a crossroads. The impact of a highly publicized
finding that ALJs are inferior officers could send ripples throughout the
administrative system. It could leave uncertain the legitimacy of ALJ
decisions in other agencies and temporarily destabilize the administrative
state while agencies scrambled to respond. However, the actual implications
on past SEC in-house hearings would be cabined.
With respect to the current SEC challenges, because the SEC already has
proposed new rules to modernize its in-house proceedings—regardless of
the outcome of these Appointments Clause cases—the challengers already
may have achieved a substantive victory. As a legal matter, the Due Process
challenges are not particularly compelling, yet they may result in changes to
the SEC’s practices that a successful Appointments Clause claim could not
bring about. Although some say the changes are still inadequate in
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Id. at 50218 (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 232(e)(2) (2016)).
Id. at 50218–19 (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 141(a)(2)(iv) (2016)).
See Due Process Restoration Act of 2015, H.R. 3798, 114th Cong. § 2(a) (2015).
If Congress tried to give ALJs unfettered power in insider trading claims, or make SEC
proceedings nearly identical to those in federal courts, it may raise other constitutional
issues. Cf. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 76 (1982)
(holding that Article III forbids Congress from granting Article I bankruptcy judges the
power “to exercise jurisdiction over all matters related to those arising under the
bankruptcy laws”).
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these litigants, by
comparison to what is available in federal court,
pressuring the SEC to reform its proceedings, may unravel a significant
aspect of Dodd-Frank. Win or lose in court, if the Due Process Restoration
Act of 2015 is enacted, these SEC respondents will get what they wanted all
along: their day in federal court.

328

See Eaglesham, supra note 19 (reporting that defense attorneys believe the proposals do
not go far enough).

